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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey period, criminal procedure was the area of
law most frequently considered by the Illinois Supreme Court.
This article discusses the most significant rulings affecting criminal
trials. Additionally, it discusses constitutional and legislative action concerning bail.
II.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A.

Roadblocks

In People v. Bartley,I the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a temporary roadblock designed to detect and deter drunk drivers.2 In Bartley, Illinois State Police supervisors
1. 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1384 (1986).
2. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 284, 486 N.E.2d at 885. The United States Supreme Court
has not addressed the constitutionality of temporary roadblocks to detect and deter
drunk drivers. The question, however, has been addressed by many other courts. The
majority of courts have ruled that roadblocks meeting certain requirements do not violate
the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d
1102 (1985); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); People v. Scott, 63
N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984). Several decisions have invalidated
arrests following roadblock stops as a result of the method of carrying out the stops. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983); State v.
Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. App.
1984); State v. Marchand, 104 Wash.2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). Two of these states
subsequently upheld roadblocks as constitutional. See Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 46
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established a checkpoint where officers stopped every westbound
vehicle during a two hour period.3 The area of the roadblock was
lighted and police vehicles had their lights flashing. 4 The stop entailed an examination of the vehicle's exterior, a driver's license
check, and a flashlight inspection of the auto's interior by a police
officer standing outside the vehicle.5 If the police observed any
possible violation of the law, they detained the driver for further
inquiry. 6
Police testified that when the defendant, Jimmy Bartley, stopped
at the checkpoint, he appeared intoxicated.7 The police then detained Bartley and subjected him to field sobriety tests which he
failed. 8 After Bartley refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, police officers arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol
or drugs ("DUI").9
At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the officers involved testified that the primary purpose of the roadblock was to check drivers' licenses,' 0 but the court found that the stop was a subterfuge
to apprehend drunken drivers." The trial court ruled that Bartley's arrest was invalid because the roadblock stop and search was
not based upon probable cause or reasonable suspicion, as required
by the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. 12
Wash. App. 110, 730 P.2d 62 (1986); State v. Super. Ct. In & For County of Pima, 143
Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984).
3. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 277, 486 N.E.2d at 881-82. In a joint effort, the Illinois State
Police, the McDonough County Sheriff's Department, the Macomb Police Department,
and the Illinois Secretary of State's Police conducted the roadblock in Macomb, Illinois.
Id. An Illinois State Police lieutenant and captain supervised the roadblock. Id.
4. Id. at 278, 486 N.E.2d at 882.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 279, 486 N.E.2d at 882-83.
8. Id.
9. Id. During the roadblock, police made 21 arrests, including seven for DUI, 10 for
illegal transportation of alcohol, and four for driver's license violations. Id. at 279, 486
N.E.2d at 882. Police also issued sixty-four written warnings. Id.
10. Id. at 278-79, 486 N.E.2d at 882-83.
11. Id.
12. Id. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling. It concluded that, although the police lacked probable
cause or individualized suspicion to stop Bartley, the roadblock
13
satisfied constitutional requirements because it was reasonable.
The court analyzed the reasonableness of the roadblock by balancing the extent of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against
the public's need for the intrusion. 14 The public's compelling interest in preventing drunken driving justified the minimal intrusion
involved in the stop."
To gauge the harm to individual privacy posed by a temporary
roadblock, the court utilized a two-part test.16 First, the court considered such factors as the length of the stop, the nature of the
questions asked by the police, and whether a search was conducted. 7 The second factor was whether the stop generated fear 8
13. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 280, 486 N.E.2d at 883. In United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that police needed
neither individualized suspicion nor a warrant to question a driver at a permanent immigration checkpoint. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 281, 486 N.E.2d at 883. Conversely, in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973) the United States Supreme Court held that police needed individualized
suspicion to stop persons in cars to find illegal aliens. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 281, 486
N.E.2d at 883.
14. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 280, 486 N.E.2d at 883. The balancing test employed by
the Bartley court was derived from Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
In Martinez-Fuerte,the Court determined that a checkpoint near the Mexican border
was justified by a substantial public need to prevent illegal aliens from migrating into the
United States. 428 U.S. at 562. The Court further found that the intrusion on individual
privacy was minimal because the checkpoint was clearly marked and lighted and because
police stopped all drivers in a brief, systematic, nonrandom procedure. Id. at 559. Accordingly, drivers had no apprehension of being singled out for arbitrary law enforcement
without warning. Id. at 560. The minimal nature of the intrusion and the great public
need for it made the roadblock stop reasonable and, hence, the Court held that the police
did not need individualized suspicion or a search warrant to question drivers at the
checkpoint. Id. at 566.
In Prouse, however, the Court invalidated an arrest based on a random stopping of
cars. 440 U.S. at 663. The Court held that police could not stop cars randomly to check
for license violations unless they had a reasonable suspicion that the driver did not possess a license. Id. The Court based its conclusion on two factors. First, the Court determined that no circumstances indicated a compelling public necessity for checking license
violations. Id. at 659-61. Second, the Court found that the police had total discretion in
selecting motorists for the spot check, and that such unbridled discretion could be
abused. Id. at 661. Therefore, the Court concluded that the random stops for license
checks were unreasonable because the need for the stops did not justify the extent of the
intrusion involved. Id. The Prouse Court, however, noted that police could use roadblocks as an alternative to spot checks. Id. at 663.
15. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 285, 486 N.E.2d at 885.
16. Id. at 281, 486 N.E.2d at 883.
17. Id. at 282, 486 N.E.2d at 884.
18. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976)).
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or annoyed motorists.1 9 In applying the balancing test, the court
concluded that the roadblock caused an insignificant intrusion because it generally consisted of a fifteen to twenty second stop, during which motorists remained in their cars and produced their

drivers' licenses. 20 Although the court acknowledged that the use
of roadblocks to deter drunk driving may be less effective than
other methods of police work, such as routine police patrol with
stopping of motorists who are driving erratically, it stressed the
necessity of permitting the State to use all available resources to
combat drunken driving. 2'
Finally, the court emphasized that the assessment of the subjective intrusiveness of the stop also depended upon whether the officers had acted with unbridled discretion.2 2 In Bartley, because
police stopped each westbound vehicle and because the police were
not singling out motorists arbitrarily for initial detention, the court
found the roadblock constitutional. 23 Thus, based upon a weighing
of the competing interests, the court held that under the procedures present in Bartley, no probable cause or individualized suspicion was necessary to establish a temporary roadblock designed to
detect and deter DUI violators.2 4
B.

Expectation of Privacy

In People v. Neal,25 the defendant, Jerry Neal, was convicted of
official misconduct 26 and forgery 27 for issuing traffic citations that
19. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 282, 486 N.E.2d at 884 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891, 895 (1975)).
20. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 287-88, 486 N.E.2d at 886.
21. Id. at 286-87, 486 N.E.2d at 886. The Bartley decision did not indicate specifically the police manpower involved in the roadblock at issue. In another Illinois decision,
some useful data appear. In People v. Conway, 135 Ill. App. 3d 887, 482 N.E.2d 437 (4th
Dist. 1985), the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the constitutionality of a DUI roadblock.
Five to seven police officers participated in the roadblock for an unstated number of
hours. Id. at 889, 482 N.E.2d at 438. Of the 582 vehicles stopped, six citations were
issued for DUI, three for driver's license violations, two for registration violations, and
five for violations of alcohol laws. Id.
22. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 289, 486 N.E.2d at 887.
23. Id. The court found that the police systematically conducted the roadblock following procedures established ahead of time by supervisory personnel, that the roadblock
was well-marked and well-lighted, that it was clear to motorists that the stop was a police
operation, and that the stops did not involve the use of a roving patrol, thereby alleviating
motorists' fears of being singled out for arbitrary law enforcement. Id. at 288, 486
N.E.2d at 887.
24. Id. at 292-93, 486 N.E.2d at 889.
25.

26.
27.

109 Ill. 2d 216, 486 N.E.2d 898 (1985).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33-3 (1985).

Id. at para. 17-3.
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he signed with a fictitious name and never turned over to the clerk
of the circuit court.28 Neal issued the citations to drivers and retained the cash bonds that they gave him.29 Upon a complaint by a
person who had been issued an irregular citation, Neal's supervisor
searched Neal's patrol car, raincoat, and pouch.30 The supervisor
found copies of the illegal citations in an unmarked, zippered, raincoat pouch located under the front seat of the patrol car.3"
Neal contended that the supervisor's search violated the fourth
amendment. Neal maintained that the search violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in the raincoat pouch because it had
been issued to him for his exclusive use.3 2 The Neal court, however, decided that society was not prepared to recognize as reasonable Neal's subjective expectation of privacy.33 In reaching this
conclusion, the court stressed that Neal's supervisors were permitted to conduct periodic inspections of the patrol car and raincoat
pouch. 34 Moreover, the court noted that Neal knew that these periodic inspections could occur in his absence. 35 Finally, the court
pointed out that Neal's supervisors had inspected only state-owned
property related to the defendant's employment.36 Concluding
that the inspection had not violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the Neal court held that the supervisor was not required to
obtain a search warrant.37
28. Neal, 109 Ill. 2d at 217-19, 486 N.E.2d at 889-900.
29. Id. at 219, 486 N.E.2d at 900.
30. Id. at 218-19, 486 N.E.2d at 899-900.
31. Id. at 219, 486 N.E.2d at 900.
32. Id. at 220, 486 N.E.2d at 900.
33. Id. at 221-22, 486 N.E.2d at 901 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring)).
34. Neal, 109 Ill. 2d at 222, 486 N.E.2d at 901.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The court held that United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951), on
which the defendant relied, was distinguishable. Neal, 109 Ill. 2d at 224, 486 N.E.2d at
902. The Blok court held that a government employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in her desk which could not be searched without a search warrant for evidence of
criminal activity unrelated to her job. 109 Ill. 2d at 220, 486 N.E.2d at 900. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that Blok was distinguishable because (1) the employee had exclusive use of her desk, (2) the offense was larceny and unrelated to her work, (3) the search
was made by a police officer, and not by her supervisor, and (4) the search was not made
pursuant to any valid office procedures. 109 Ill. 2d at 224, 486 N.E.2d at 902. The Neal
result is consistent with other cases involving similar facts. See, e.g., United States v.
Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975); Shaffer v. Field, 339
F. Supp. 997 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Tidwell,
133 Ill. App. 2d 1, 266 N.E.2d 787 (1st Dist. 1971). In addition, the United States
Supreme Court recently considered a similar issue in O'Connor v. Ortega, 55 U.S.L.W.
4405, 4410 (U.S. March 31, 1987) (No. 85-530) ("[P]ublic employer intrusions on the
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C. Probable Cause to Search
In People v. Gutierrez,3" police officers had purchased drugs from
a woman and then obtained a warrant to search her home.39 When
police arrived to execute the warrant, the defendant, Frank Gutierrez, unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the police from entering. 4°
During the ensuing search pursuant to the warrant, Gutierrez appeared "agitated." 4 After noticing bulges in Gutierrez's pocket,
an officer requested that he empty them.4 2 At that point, the officer
recovered heroin from Gutierrez who subsequently was convicted
of possession of a controlled substance.43
On appeal, Gutierrez argued that the trial court erred in denying
45
his motion to suppress. 44 Gutierrez relied upon Ybarra v. Illinois
as authority for his contention that the police had searched him
illegally.4 6 In Ybarra, the United States Supreme Court held that a
search warrant did not yield probable cause to search a subject on
the premises named in the warrant. 47 The Illinois Supreme Court,
however, distinguished the instant case from Ybarra because Gutierrez's suspicious behavior and apparent connection with the
premises provided the police with probable cause, independent of
the warrant, to search him.48
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.")
38. 109 Ill. 2d 59, 485 N.E.2d 845 (1985).
39. Id. at 61, 485 N.E.2d at 846.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
46. Gutierrez, 109 Ill. 2d at 62, 485 N.E.2d at 846-47. In Ybarra, 444 U.S. 85 (1979),
the police obtained a warrant to search a tavern and one of its bartenders. Ybarra, 444
U.S. at 88. During the execution of that warrant, the police searched all the patrons of
the tavern, including the defendant, although they did not have any reason to believe that
any patron possessed weapons or had committed any illegal activity. Id. at 90-91. During the search of the defendant, the police found heroin contained in a cigarette package.
Id. at 88-89.
47. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91. The Court ruled that "a person's mere propinquity to
others independently suspected of criminal activity [did] not, without more, give rise to
probable cause to search that person." Id. Accordingly, the Ybarra Court concluded
that the search warrant gave police license to search the tavern and the bartender, but did
not give them authority to search each patron of the tavern. Id. at 92.
48. Gutierrez, 109 Ill. 2d at 64, 485 N.E.2d at 847. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
108-9 (1985) provides: "In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same
may reasonably detain to search any person in the place at the time: (a) to protect himself
from attack, or (b) to prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles, or
things particularly described in the warrant." Illinois courts have interpreted this section
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Probable Cause to Arrest

In People v. Wright,49 the Illinois Supreme Court examined
whether police had probable cause to make an arrest.5 0 The arresting officer in Wright knew that a homicide had been committed by
a man whose description matched that of the defendant.5 Further, police suspected Wright because he wore glasses similar to
those recovered at the crime scene, and because he had a shoe fe52
tish and shoes in the victim's apartment had been disturbed.
While on patrol, the police officer arrested Wright on a street near
the scene of the homicide, a few hours
after the crime. 3 He was
54
not wearing eyeglasses at that time.
The supreme court held that information known to the police
when they apprehended the defendant provided probable cause to
arrest."5 The court concluded that the police had "knowledge of
facts which would lead a reasonable [person] to believe that a
crime [had] occurred and that it [had] been committed by the defendant."56 Accordingly, the supreme court held that the trial
court had properly denied Wright's motion to suppress his postarrest statement and affirmed the conviction. 7
as authorizing a search of a person only if that person has a significant connection with
the persons or premises named in the warrant; it does not permit a search of a person
who just happens to be on the premises during the execution of a warrant on that basis
alone. See People v. Campbell, 67 Ill. App. 3d 748, 752-53, 385 N.E.2d 171, 173-74 (3d
Dist. 1979); People v. Miller, 74 Ill. App. 3d 177, 184-85, 392 N.E.2d 271, 275-77 (1st
Dist. 1979).
49. 111 Ill. 2d 128, 490 N.E.2d 640 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1327 (1987).
50. Id. at 141, 490 N.E.2d at 644.
51. Id. at 142, 490 N.E.2d at 644. After his arrest, the defendant's statement revealed
that he entered the apartment of a woman and her daughter, attempted to rape both of
them, and then stabbed each woman. Id. at 138-39, 490 N.E.2d at 642. The defendant
also stated that he had planned to burglarize the apartment. Id.
52. Id. at 142-45, 490 N.E.2d at 644-45.
53. Id. at 142, 490 N.E.2d at 644.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 147, 490 N.E.2d at 646. An arrest is lawful when a peace officer "has
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an
offense." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 107-2(c) (1985). "Reasonable grounds" is
equivalent to "probable cause." Wright, 111Ill1. 2d at 145, 490 N.E.2d at 645 (citing
People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 236-37, 469 N.E.2d 147, 153 (1984)).
56. Wright, 111 Ill.
2d at 145, 490 N.E.2d at 646 (quoting People v. Eddmonds, 101
Ill. 2d 44, 60, 461 N.E.2d 347, 354, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 894 (1984)).
57. Wright, 111 111. 2d at 147, 490 N.E.2d at 646.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION

The Jury's Evaluation of the Veracity of a Confession

In People v. Britz, 8 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in not admitting into evidence pre-confession tape recordings which could have been relevant in the jury's assessment of
the defendant's confession. 9 In Britz, the defendant, John Britz,
contacted a youth counselor and told her that he had committed a
murder. 6° The counselor then contacted the police and agreed to
place an eavesdropping device on her telephone. 61 In several subsequent recorded conversations with the counselor, the defendant
denied involvement in the murder.62 When initially questioned by
the police, Britz again asserted his innocence. 63 When police challenged the truthfulness of the statements, however, Britz
confessed.' 4
At trial, the court refused to admit into evidence the tape-recorded telephone conversations in which Britz denied guilt. 65 The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, held that the tapes should have
been admitted into evidence. 66 Notwithstanding the trial court's
finding that Britz had confessed voluntarily, the court noted that it
was up to the jury to evaluate the confession for veracity. 67 Moreover, because a possibility existed that the defendant may have
thought that the counselor would have been impressed by a confession to murder, the circumstances surrounding the confession were
especially relevant to the jury's assessment of Britz's state of mind
and the weight to be accorded the confession.68
58. 112 Il1.2d 314, 493 N.E.2d 575 (1986). Britz also raised an issue regarding jury
selection. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
59. Id. at 320-21, 493 N.E.2d at 577.
60. Id. at 317, 493 N.E.2d at 576.
61. Id.
62. Id. During the conversations, the counselor told Britz that his involvement with
the police "turn[ed her] on" and that the defendant was "a real man." Id. Britz also told
the counselor that he loved her. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 317-18, 493 N.E.2d at 576.
65. Id. at 319, 493 N.E.2d at 577. The appellate court reversed the conviction and
held that the tapes were admissible as bearing on the defendant's state of mind which was
relevant to the question of voluntariness of the confessions. Id.
66. Id. at 320-21, 493 N.E.2d at 578.
67. Id. at 319-20, 493 N.E.2d at 577.
68. Id. at 320, 493 N.E.2d at 577. Accord Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 2142
(1986)(due process requires that a defendant be allowed to present evidence at trial that
bears upon the credibility of his pre-trial statement when that statement is introduced in
evidence by the prosecution). The Britz court rejected the State's argument that the tapes
were inadmissible hearsay. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d at 320, 493 N.E.2d at 578. The court held
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Voluntariness

In People v. Kashney,6 9 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
whether a defendant's statement was voluntary if made in response
to misrepresentations by police. 70 During initial police questioning
regarding a sexual assault, the defendant denied committing the
crime.71 Subsequently, an assistant state's attorney falsely informed the defendant that his fingerprints were found in the victim's apartment. 7 The defendant then admitted to 73
being in the
apartment and to having intercourse with the victim.
To determine the voluntariness of the defendant's statement, the
court examined the totality of the circumstances, including the
misrepresentation. 4 Several factors led the court to conclude that
Kashney had made the statement voluntarily despite the misrepresentation. 75 First, the defendant willingly had presented himself
for questioning. 6 Second, the defendant knowingly had waived his
Miranda rights.7 7 Finally, the court noted that the defendant had
not alleged that the police had threatened him during the
that the counselor's stimulating language was admissible for the limited purpose of establishing the effect that it had on Britz. Id. at 320-21, 493 N.E.2d at 578.
69. 111 Ill.
2d 454, 490 N.E.2d 688 (1986). This case is a consolidation of two cases:
People v. Kashney, 129 Ill. App. 3d 218, 472 N.E.2d 164 (1st Dist. 1984), and People v.
Lee, 128 Ill. App. 3d 774, 471 N.E.2d 567 (1st Dist. 1984).
70. Id. at 465, 490 N.E.2d at 690.
71. Id. at 465, 490 N.E.2d at 691.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 466, 490 N.E.2d at 693. (citing People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412, 466
N.E.2d 228, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 935 (1984)). In Martin, the defendant made incriminating statements after he was told falsely that his co-defendant had named him as the
"triggerman." 102 Ill. 2d at 417, 466 N.E.2d at 229-30. The Martin court held that a
misrepresentation which prompted inculpatory statements did not necessarily vitiate an
otherwise voluntary statement. Id. at 427, 466 N.E.2d at 234. Rather, the court should
look to the totality of the circumstances. Id. The Martin court considered factors such
as (1) the intelligence and education of the defendant, (2) the length of questioning, (3)
whether the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, and (4) whether the defendant was subjected to any physical intimidation. Id. at 427, 466 N.E.2d at 235.
75. Kashney, 111 111. 2d at 467, 490 N.E.2d at 694.
76. Id. at 466, 490 N.E.2d at 693.
77. Id. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme
Court held that the fifth amendment requires the suppression of any statement made
during custodial interrogation unless, prior to any questioning, law enforcement officials
explain to a suspect that (1) he has a right to remain silent, (2) any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, (3) he has a right to have an attorney present
during questioning, and (4) an attorney will be appointed for him if he is indigent. Furthermore, the Court held that the suspect may waive these rights, but that the waiver
must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 384 U.S. at 467-73.
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questioning.78
C.

Comment on Defendant's Silence

In People v. Bean, 79 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction because of comments by co-defendant's counsel concerning the defendant's failure to testify.80 In Bean, the
defendant, Harold Bean, was tried jointly with a co-defendant for
murder and other crimes. 81 Throughout the trial, the co-defendant's counsel made reference to Bean's failure to testify and tried to
convince the jury that Bean had committed the crimes and that the
co-defendant had not. 2 In response to these prejudicial comments,
Bean's attorney made repeated motions for a mistrial which the
trial court denied. 3
In reversing Bean's conviction,84 the supreme court held that the
statements had the same effect as a comment by a judge or prosecutor about the accused's failure to take the stand.85 Hence, the
comments by co-defendant's counsel violated Bean's fifth amendment right not to testify. 6
In People v. Stack,87 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a conviction because of a violation of the privilege against self- incrimi78. Kashney, 111 111. 2d at 466, 490 N.E.2d at 693. The court, however, reversed the
convictions on other grounds. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
79. 109 Ill. 2d 80, 485 N.E.2d 349 (1985).
80. Id. at 92, 485 N.E.2d at 354.
81. Id. at 84, 485 N.E.2d at 350.
82. Id. at 87-88, 485 N.E.2d at 352. For example, during his opening statement, the
co-defendant's attorney stated, "[T]he defendant need never take the stand because the
burden of proof is on the state. But [the co-defendant] is going to take the witness stand
.... Because an innocent man can't wait to tell his story. And a guilty man will never
take the stand." Id. at 87, 485 N.E.2d at 352.
83. Id. at 90, 485 N.E.2d at 353.
84. The court also based its reversal on the grounds that the trial court should have
granted Bean's motion for a severance. Id. at 92, 488 N.E.2d at 354. For discussion of
the severance issue, see infra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
85. Id. at 98, 485 N.E.2d at 357.
86. Id. at 98, 485 N.E.2d at 358 (citing DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th
Cir. 1962)). In DeLuna, two defendants were jointly indicted and tried. The co-defendant's counsel in DeLuna repeatedly commented upon DeLuna's failure to testify. The
court reversed DeLuna's conviction, holding that the comment by the co-defendant's
counsel violated DeLuna's right to remain silent and that the trial judge's instructions to
the jury to disregard the counsel's comments did not undo the prejudicial effects of the
references to DeLuna's silence. DeLuna, 308 F.2d at 154. Unlike the judge in DeLuna,
the trial judge in Bean made no instructions to the jury regarding comments by the codefendant's counsel. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 98, 485 N.E.2d at 357.
87. 112 Ill. 2d 301, 493 N.E.2d 339, cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 236 (1986).
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nation. 8 In Stack, the defendant asserted an insanity defense. 9
To rebut the defendant's claim of insanity, the State introduced
evidence that Stack had refused to speak after being given Miranda
warnings. 90 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, concluded that
the State's use of this evidence was barred under the United States
Supreme Court decision in Wainwright v Greenfield,91 which held
that the use of post-Miranda silence as evidence of sanity was fundamentally unfair because it constituted a breach of the State's implied promise not to use the exercise of Miranda rights against a
defendant.

92

In People v. Neal,93 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that the prosecutor had referred to his failure to
testify and therefore violated his right to remain silent. 94 In Neal,
the prosecutor told the jury during the sentencing phase of a capital case that "you have not seen or observed in court one moment
of remorse by the defendant." 95 The court held that the prosecutor's comment was not improper because it referred to Neal's taped
confession, rather than to Neal's failure to testify. 96
88. Id. at 310, 493 N.E.2d at 343. Stack was also reversed on other grounds. For
further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 304, 493 N.E.2d at 340.
90. Id. at 305-06, 493 N.E.2d at 341. The State acknowledged that it could not comment on Stack's silence to draw an inference of guilt. Id.
91. 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986).
92. Stack, 112 Ill. 2d at 307, 493 N.E.2d at 341 (citing Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106
S. Ct. 634 (1986)).
93. 111 Ill. 2d 180, 489 N.E.2d 845 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2292 (1986).
94. Id. at 196, 489 N.E.2d at 851. The Neal court distinguished the defendant's claim
from those situations in which a prosecutor comments on a defendant's assertion of his
right to remain silent. Id. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (the use of the defendant's post-arrest silence by the prosecutor at trial in order to impeach the defendant violates due process); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment by the prosecutor
on the defendant's failure to testify violated the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment); People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 390, 478 N.E.2d 291, 297 (1985) (a prosecutor cannot comment on a defendant's failure to take the stand in his own behalf), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 171 (1986). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 155-1 (1985), which
states in pertinent part: "the person's neglect to testify shall not create any presumption
against the person, nor shall the court permit any reference or comment to be made to or
upon such neglect."
95. Neal, 111 Ill. 2d at 195-96, 489 N.E.2d at 851.
96. Id. at 196, 489 N.E.2d at 851. The Neal court cited People v. Albanese, 102 Ill.
2d 54, 80-81, 464 N.E.2d 206, 219, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984), for the proposition
that the defendant's remorse may be considered at sentencing. Neal, 111 Ill.
2d at 196,
489 N.E.2d at 851. The Neal court stated that the trial court had corrected any potential
prejudicial effect from the prosecutor's comment by instructing the jury to disregard the
comment. Id.
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IV.
A.

GUILTY PLEAS

Voluntariness

In People v. Correa,97 the defendant, Cesar Correa, contended
that his pleas of guilty were not made knowingly and intelligently
because they were based on erroneous advice of counsel. 98 Specifically, Correa, an alien, entered the guilty pleas without knowledge
that he could be deported as a result of the convictions.9 9 The Illinois Supreme Court held that Correa's guilty pleas were not made
voluntarily and knowingly because they were entered in reliance
upon counsel's erroneous response to Correa's inquiry as to
whether a conviction could result in his deportation. °°
In People v. McCutcheon,'0 the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the defendant, John McCutcheon, knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea to an attempt murder charge. 10 2 In
McCutcheon, the appellate court concluded that the defendant had
pleaded guilty without being apprised sufficiently of the nature of
the charge against him. The court reasoned that the grammatical
structure of the attempt murder counts could have led him to believe mistakenly that he could have been found guilty of attempt
murder if his intent was only to cause great bodily harm. 03
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, held that McCutcheon
had been apprised sufficiently of the nature of the charges.10 The
97. 108 Ill. 2d 541, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985). This decision also addressed the issue of
incompetence of counsel. For a discussion of that issue, see infra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
98. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d at 544, 485 N.E.2d at 308.
99. Id. Correa entered pleas of guilty to three charges of delivery of a controlled
substance and the court sentenced him to concurrent terms of three years in prison on
each charge. Id. After Correa's release from prison, the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service took him into custody and ordered his deportation. Id. Correa
contended that he then first learned that his guilty pleas were grounds for deportation.
Id. at 544, 485 N.E.2d at 307-08. At a post-conviction hearing, the trial court held that
the guilty pleas were not made voluntarily. Id. The trial court vacated the convictions,
set aside the guilty pleas, and set a new trial date. Id. The State appealed and the appellate court affirmed. Id.
100. Id. at 553, 485 N.E.2d at 312. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970) (plea of guilty must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences).
101. 111 Ill. 2d 487, 490 N.E.2d 662, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 135 (1986).
102. Id. at 493-94, 490 N.E.2d at 665.
103. Id. at 491, 490 N.E.2d at 663-64 (citing People v. Roberts, 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387
N.E.2d 331 (1975)).
104. McCutcheon, 111 111. 2d at 493, 490 N.E.2d at 665. The attempt murder counts
read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Count I: . . . said defendant with the intent to commit the offense of Murder,
...performed a substantial step toward the commission of that offense, in that
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court determined that the language of the attempt murder charge
°5 Accordwas identical to the language approved in a prior case."
0 6
conviction.
the
reinstated
ingly, the supreme court
The court also analyzed the voluntariness of a guilty plea in People v. Walker.10 7 In Walker, the defendant, Charles Walker, asserted that he had not entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea
because the court erred in explaining the range of sentences for
multiple murders."0 8 Although Illinois law mandates a sentence of
not less than natural life upon conviction of murdering more than
one person, the trial court had told Walker that he could receive a
sentence ranging from twenty years to death.'0 9
Even assuming that the trial court's explanation had misled
Walker, the Illinois Supreme Court held that he voluntarily
pleaded guilty.' " The court found that the trial court had complied substantially with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402'11 which
requires the court to inform the defendant of the minimum and
maximum sentences for the crime to which the defendant is pleading guilty. 1' 2 Furthermore, the court examined the entire record
he, without lawful justification, knowingly struck Shara Briner on the head with
a tire iron, knowing such act created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to Shara Briner. Count II: ...said defendant with the intent to
commit the offense of Murder, . . .performed a substantial step toward the
commission of that offense, in that he without lawful justification, and with the
intent to do great bodily harm to Shara Briner knowingly struck Shara Briner
with a tire iron, knowing such act created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to Shara Briner.
Id. at 490-91, 490 N.E.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
105. McCutcheon, 111111. 2d at 493, 490 N.E.2d at 665 (citing People v. Van Winkle,
88 Ill. 2d 220, 224, 430 N.E.2d 987, 989 (1981)). In Van Winkle, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the language in the attempt murder charge did not "negate the requirement of proof of the specific intent to kill." Van Winkle, 88 Ill. 2d at 224, 430 N.E.2d at
989. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-4 (1985), which states, "a person commits an
attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes
a substantial step toward the commission of that offense." Id.
106. McCutcheon, 111 111. 2d at 493, 490 N.E.2d at 665.
107. 109 Ill. 2d 484, 488 N.E.2d 529 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 598 (1986).
108. Id. at 496, 488 N.E.2d at 534.
109. Id. at 496-97, 488 N.E.2d at 534. Walker pleaded guilty to two murders. Id. at
489, 488 N.E.2d at 531. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c)(1985), states in
relevant part: "If a defendant has been found guilty of murdering more than one victim,
the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment." Id.
110. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d at 498-99, 488 N.E.2d at 535.
111. ILL. S. CT. R. 402, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402 (1985). Rule 402 was
enacted to insure compliance with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969). Walker, 109 Ill. 2d at 498, 488 N.E.2d at 535. Boykin requires that a guilty plea
be shown to have been made intelligently and voluntarily before it could be accepted by
the court. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244.
2d at 498, 488 N.E.2d at 535 (citing People v. Stewart, 101 Ill.
112. Walker, 109 Ill.
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and concluded that the trial court's misstatement had not misled
Walker, and that Walker had understood the nature of the
charges. 113 The court noted that Walker knew that the prosecutor
had planned to ask for the death penalty, and that Walker had
to be sentenced to nothing less than life
stated that he 1expected
4
imprisonment. 1
Walker also contended that he had neither knowingly nor voluntarily entered the guilty plea because the trial court failed to advise
him of the possible plea of guilty but mentally ill. 15 The supreme
court, however, held that the trial court had no duty to advise
Walker of this plea because Walker had not offered any evidence
that such a plea might be appropriate.1 1 6 The court emphasized
that a guilty but mentally ill plea would have depended upon
Walker's alleged alcoholism. The supreme court determined that
the plea would not have been appropriate because Walker had denied that he suffered from alcohol dependence. 1 7
B.

Specific Enforcement of Plea Agreement

The final case to be discussed regarding guilty pleas, People v.
Boyt,"18 involved whether a prosecutor must honor a plea agreement. In that case, the defendant, Kathleen Boyt, agreed to testify
against her co-defendant. 9 In exchange for her testimony, the
prosecutor agreed to allow Boyt to enter a guilty plea to reduced
charges with the prosecutor recommending a specific sentence. 2°
Before Boyt could testify, however, the co-defendant pleaded guilty
2d 470, 484, 463 N.E.2d 677, 684, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984) (quoting People v.
Krantz, 58 Ill. 2d 187, 192, 317 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1974))).
113. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d at 499, 488 N.E.2d at 535.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 500, 488 N.E.2d at 535. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-2 (1985),
which provides, in part, that a court may accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill after it
has determined that there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill at the time
of the offense. Id.
116. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d at 500, 488 N.E.2d at 536.
117. Id. In a related argument, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and substitute for it a plea of guilty but
mentally ill. Id. at 501-02, 488 N.E.2d at 536. Walker made a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea after the court had already entered judgment on that plea. Id. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-2 (1985), guides a trial court in determining whether to accept a
plea of guilty but mentally ill. That section, however, is applicable before or during trial,
but not after judgment has been entered. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d at 501, 488 N.E.2d at 536.
Thus, the court rejected Walker's contention because he had not made the substituted
plea in a timely fashion. Id. at 501, 488 N.E.2d at 536.
118. 109 Ill. 2d 403, 488 N.E.2d 264 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2254 (1986).
119. Id. at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 266.
120. Id.
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to robbery.' 21 The State then refused to honor its agreement with
Boyt. 12 2 The trial court ordered specific performance of the plea
agreement. 23 When the State would not abide24 by the order, the
court dismissed the indictments against Boyt.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred in ordering specific performance of the plea agreement.1 25
The court found that an unexecuted plea agreement was not a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest which could be
specifically enforced under the due process clause. 26 In addition,
the court noted that Boyt had not pleaded guilty in reliance on the
prosecutor's promise, and that the State had not deprived Boyt of
her liberty in any way. 2 Thus, absent a showing that the agreement affected Boyt's due process rights, the
court ruled that she
2
was not entitled to specific performance.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Santobello, a judge
imposed a maximum sentence on the defendant after the prosecutor, who did not know
about any plea agreement between the defendant and a former prosecutor, recommended
the maximum sentence. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 259-60. The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment, holding that a prosecutor's promise must be fulfilled when it induces a guilty
plea. Id. at 262.
124. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 266. The appellate court held that dismissal was inappropriate, reversed the order of dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 407, 488 N.E.2d at 266.
125. Id. at 415, 488 N.E.2d at 270.
126. Id. The concern of due process is not with the benefit conferred on the State,
but rather, "the manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984). The defendant in Boyt cited People v. Starks, 106 Ill. 2d
441, 478 N.E.2d 350 (1985), as controlling authority for her request for specific enforcement. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d at 415-16, 488 N.E.2d at 270. The prosecutor in Starks had
promised that if the defendant took and passed a polygraph test, charges against him
would be dismissed. Starks, 106 Ill. 2d at 444, 478 N.E.2d at 352. The Illinois Supreme
Court reasoned that the defendant surrendered his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination by submitting to the polygraph examination and, therefore, that due process required the prosecutor to drop the charges. Id. at 451, 478 N.E.2d at 355. Distinguishing Starks from Boyt, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, unlike the defendant in
Starks, Boyt had surrendered no rights in reliance on the prosecutor's promise. Boyt, 109
Ill. 2d at 416, 488 N.E.2d at 271. In a dissent joined by Justices Simon and Goldenhersh,
Chief Justice Clark argued that Boyt's reliance on Starks was not misplaced. Id. at 417,
488 N.E.2d at 271 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that by agreeing to
testify, the defendant incriminated herself by confessing her presence and knowledge of
the crime, which should have entitled her to specific performance of the plea agreement.
Id. at 419, 488 N.E.2d at 272 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
127. Boyt, 109 Ill.2d at 415, 488 N.E.2d at 270.
128. Id.
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V.

A.

INSANITY DEFENSE

Use of Statements Made During Fitness Examination to
Rebut Insanity Defense

In People v. Kashney, 29 the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated
two cases to consider whether the State may introduce, for purposes of impeachment, statements made by a defendant during a
court-ordered fitness examination.1 30 According to Illinois law, the
State can use such statements only if the defendant has raised an
insanity or intoxication defense. 13 ' Prior to trial, the first defendant, Ronald Kashney, filed a suppression motion, claiming that he
32
had confessed to murder because a police officer had hit him.
After the trial court denied this motion, it found Kashney unfit to
stand trial and remanded him to the Department of Mental
134
Health. 133 Subsequently, Kashney was ruled fit to stand trial.
At trial, Kashney denied committing the crime charged and
claimed that demons possessing one of the investigating officers coerced him into confessing. 35 To support his claim, Kashney called
two psychiatrists who had participated in the court-ordered examination. 136 The State impeached the psychiatrists' testimony 3with
7
statements that Kashney had made during the examination.
On appeal, Kashney argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce his statements because he had not tech129. 111 Ill. 2d 454, 490 N.E.2d 688 (1986).
130. Id. at 458, 490 N.E.2d at 690. The court consolidated People v. Kashney, 129
Ill. App. 3d 218, 472 N.E.2d 164 (1st Dist. 1984), and People v. Lee, 128 Ill. App. 3d
774, 471 N.E.2d 567 (1st Dist. 1984).
131. The issue in Kashney arose under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 104-14(a)
(1985), which provides in pertinent part:
Statements made by the defendant and information gathered in the course of
any [court-ordered] examination or treatment shall not be admissible against
the defendant unless he raises the defense of insanity or the defense of drugged
or intoxicated condition, in which case they shall be admissible only on the
issue of whether he was insane, drugged or intoxicated.
Id.
The statute governing the insanity defense provides that "[a] person is not criminally
responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or
mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 6-2(a)(1985).
132. Kashney, 111 Ill. 2d at 459, 490 N.E.2d at 690.
133. Id. at 459-60, 490 N.E.2d at 690.
134. Id. at 460, 490 N.E.2d at 690.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 460, 490 N.E. 2d at 691.
137. Id.
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nically asserted an insanity defense. 3 ' The court stated that the
pivotal issue was not whether Kashney had raised the insanity defense but, rather, whether Kashney waived his right to exclude the
statements at trial. 139 The court held that Kashney had waived the
right to exclude the statements by calling psychiatrists to testify in
support of his coerced confession claim."
The court reached a contrary result in the second case. There,
the defendant, David Lee, testified that the complainant falsely accused him of rape as a result of his verbal abuse towards her during
consensual intercourse."' Lee's psychiatrist testified at trial that
Lee suffered from a mental disorder which could cause verbal or
physical abusiveness.'42 In rebuttal, the State called the psychiatrist who had interviewed Lee pursuant to a court order.' 43 The
psychiatrist testified that Lee had told him that he was abusive
with the complainant because he felt anger towards her, and, further, because he had heard a voice commanding him to "[g]et her,
kill her, choke her, [and] beat her."' 144
Like Kashney, Lee maintained that the State was precluded
from using these statements because the insanity defense had not
been asserted.' 45 The State contended that it could use the statements to impeach the testimony of the defendant's psychiatrist because the defendant, in effect, had raised the insanity defense by
introducing expert testimony that he suffered from a psychiatric
disorder. 146 The supreme court disagreed and concluded that Lee
had not raised the insanity defense. 147 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach
138. Id. at 457-58, 490 N.E.2d at 689-690.
139. Id. at 461, 490 N.E.2d at 691.
140. Id. The court also noted that the defendant had agreed that the State could
cross-examine the psychiatrists as to their diagnosis of Kashney. Id.
141. Id. at 463, 490 N.E.2d at 692.
142. Id. at 462-63, 490 N.E.2d at 692. The psychiatrist testified that Lee suffered
from post-traumatic stress syndrome characterized by flashbacks to prior stressful experiences. Id. at 462, 490 N.E.2d at 692. Lee testified that he was abusive with the complainant because of a flashback to experiences at a brothel that he had frequented while in
the military service. Id. at 463, 490 N.E.2d at 692.
143. Id. at 463, 490 N.E.2d at 692.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 464, 490 N.E.2d at 692.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 465, 490 N.E.2d at 693. The court stated that a defendant raises the
insanity defense when he admits the offense charged but claims he suffered from insanity
at the time of the act. Id. at 464-65, 490 N.E.2d at 693. The court explained that Lee
denied that he committed the rape and had called the psychiatrist to explain why the
complainant falsely accused him. Id. at 465, 490 N.E.2d at 693.

1986]

Criminal Procedure

the defendant with his fitness examination statements. 148
B.

Use of Insanity Defense at Probation Revocation Hearing

In People v. Allegri,1 49 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
defendant could not raise the insanity defense in a probation revocation proceeding.1 50 In that case, the defendant, Anita Allegri,
violated her probation by committing a crime.'
At the ensuing
probation revocation hearing, Allegri raised the insanity defense,
arguing that her probation could not be revoked because she was
not criminally responsible for her actions. ' 52 The trial court ruled
that the insanity defense
could not be asserted in a probation revo53
cation proceeding.1
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
noted that the Illinois Criminal Code was silent on the question of
whether an insanity defense could be invoked in a probation revocation hearing.' 54 The court reasoned that, because probation is
granted when a convicted person's release into the community will
not present a threat to society, it can be revoked when the defendant subsequently poses a threat to society. 5 5 Accordingly, the
court concluded that whether the defendant's insanity would excuse her from criminal responsibility56was irrelevant for purposes of
a probation revocation proceeding.1
148. Id. at 465, 490 N.E.2d at 693.
149. 109 Ill. 2d 309, 487 N.E.2d 606 (1985).
150. Id. at 317, 487 N.E.2d at 609. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-4
(1985), concerning probation revocation hearing procedures.
151. Allegri, 109 I1. 2d at 311, 487 N.E.2d at 606. Allegri was charged with unlawfully attempting to take a two-year-old child from his father in violation of ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-3(a) (1985). Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d at 311, 487 N.E.2d at 606. After
entering a negotiated plea, she was sentenced to thirty months probation. Id. One of the
probation conditions required Allegri to refrain from violating any state laws. Id. Six
months later, the State charged Allegri with a probation violation and attempted to revoke her probation because she unlawfully restrained a 13-year-old boy. Id.
152. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d at 312, 487 N.E.2d at 606.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 313, 487 N.E.2d at 607.
155. Id. at 314, 487 N.E.2d at 607-08. The court also noted that other state and
federal courts considering this issue have reached similar conclusions. Id. at 316, 487
N.E.2d at 608. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Police Court, 610 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1979); Knight
v. Estelle, 501 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975); Pierce v. State
Department of Social & Health Services, 97 Wash. 2d 552, 646 P.2d 1382 (1982); State ex
rel. Lyons v. Department of Health & Social Services, 105 Wis. 2d 146, 312 N.W.2d 868
(1980).
156. Allegri, 109 I11.2d at 314, 487 N.E.2d at 607-08. The Illinois Criminal Code
states that, "[t]he court may at any time terminate probation ... if warranted by the
conduct of the offender and the ends of justice as provided in Section 5-6-4." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-2(c)(1985) (emphasis added). The court construed the legisla-
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Double Jeopardy as Limitation on the State's
Power to Prosecute

In People v. Mueller,"' the defendant, Neil Mueller, shot and
killed two men and concealed their bodies on his farm.158 Later, he
deposited the bodies into a creek in another county. 159 After a jury
a
acquitted Mueller on charges of murder, 16° the State obtained
161
homicide.
a
of
concealment
for
county
another
in
conviction
On appeal, Mueller contended that the conviction for concealment of a homicide after the murder acquittal violated his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. 162 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the offenses
of murder and concealment of a homicide were distinct because
each required different acts and different mental states, and because each required proof of a fact that the other did not. 163 Thus,
the court held that the State did not prosecute Mueller twice for
the same offense.' 6 '
ture's choice of the word "conduct" to suggest that the key question is whether objective
acts require revocation, not whether one is legally responsible for such acts. Allegri, 109
Ill. 2d at 314-15, 487 N.E.2d at 608. In dissent, Justice Ward stated that the General
Assembly intended to insure fairness toward those with mental disease or defect by enacting the insanity defense. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d at 318, 487 N.E.2d at 609. Accordingly, he
concluded, "[i]t is inconceivable that the General Assembly intended that this fairness to
handicapped persons would not be extended to all proceedings and especially to those in
which punishment was sought by the state." Id. (Ward, J., dissenting).
157. 109 Ill. 2d 378, 488 N.E.2d 523 (1985).
158. Id. at 381, 488 N.E.2d at 524.
159. Id.
160. Id. Mueller claimed he committed the shootings in self-defense. Id. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 7-1 (1985), which provides in pertinent part: "a person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes
that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force." Id.
161. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d at 381, 488 N.E.2d at 524. Concealment of a homicidal
death occurs when a person "conceals the death ... with knowledge that such other
person has died by homicidal means." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.1 (1985).
162. Mueller, 109 I11.2d at 382, 488 N.E.2d at 524-25. The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that "no person shall be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb". U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The Illinois
constitution also contains a double jeopardy provision. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
163. Id. at 388, 488 N.E.2d at 527-28. To determine whether the offenses were distinct, the court looked to the statutory elements of the offenses charged, and determined
"whether each provision [in the two offenses] require[d] proof of a fact which the other
[did] not." Id. (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
164. The court rejected Mueller's double jeopardy argument, which was based on
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977), that concealment of a homicide was a lesser
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Mueller also argued that the State could not try him for concealment of a homicide because it had relied on evidence of the concealment to prove Mueller's intent to commit murder. 165 The
Illinois Supreme Court responded by stating that a substantial
overlap in the proof adduced at separate prosecutions did not nec1 66
essarily give rise to a double jeopardy violation.
Finally, the court rejected Mueller's contention that the murders
and the act of concealment constituted one course of action which
compelled the State to try both the charges at once. 167 The Mueller
court held that the compulsory joinder statute 6 required joinder
only when the offenses were based on the same act.' 69 Although
the acts were related, the court determined that the crimes could
be tried separately because the defendant had accomplished the
70
murder and concealment of a homicide by different acts.1
Another decision involving double jeopardy was People ex rel.
Daley v. Crilly.17 1 In Crilly, a jury found the defendant guilty of
included offense of murder. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d at 390, 488 N.E.2d at 528. In Harris,the
United States Supreme Court held that a prior conviction for felony murder based on a
robbery barred a subsequent prosecution for the robbery itself. Harris,433 U.S. at 682.
Unlike the robbery in Harris,concealment of a homicide would not be established automatically by a conviction for murder and, thus, was not a lesser included offense. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d at 390, 488 N.E.2d at 528-29.
165. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d at 387, 488 N.E.2d at 527. In support of his challenge to the
concealment charge, Mueller cited People v. Zegart, 83 Ill. 2d 440, 415 N.E.2d 341
(1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 948 (1981). Id. In Zegart, the court held that, after the
defendant was convicted of illegally crossing a highway median, double jeopardy barred
the State from a subsequent reckless homicide prosecution in which the State planned to
use the factual basis which led to the first conviction as the basis for the second conviction. Zegart, 83 Ill. 2d at 445, 415 N.E.2d at 343-44.
166. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d at 387, 488 N.E.2d at 527 (citing Ianelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17 (1975)). In lanelli,the United States Supreme Court held that an
overlap in proof would not raise a double jeopardy question as long as the offenses
charged were distinct. lanelli, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17. The Mueller court noted that if
the concealment issue had been resolved in favor of the defendant by the court during the
initial prosecution, then the State would have been collaterally estopped from trying that
issue in a subsequent prosecution. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d at 387, 488 N.E.2d at 527 (citing
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)). In Mueller, the defendant did not contend that
the concealment issue had already been resolved, and therefore collateral estoppel did not
apply. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d at 388, 488 N.E.2d at 527.
167. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d at 386, 488 N.E.2d at 527. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
(1977)(double jeopardy protections could not be circumvented by dividing one continuing
offense into several individual offenses to prosecute a defendant repeatedly).
168. Illinois law provides: "[i]f the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a
single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution ... if they are based on the
same act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-3(b)(1985).
169. Mueller, 109 I11. 2d at 385, 488 N.E.2d at 526.
170. Id.
171. 108 Ill. 2d 301, 483 N.E. 2d 1236 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1261 (1986).
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conspiracy to commit murder but failed to reach a verdict on a
murder charge. 72 The trial court discharged the jury without declaring a mistrial and entered judgment on the conspiracy
charge. 73 Subsequently, the trial judge granted the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict of not 74guilty and entered a judgment
of acquittal on the murder charge.
Thereafter, the State sought a writ of mandamus against the trial
judge, contending that his act of discharging the jury and declaring
a mistrial had the effect of "nullifying" the entire murder trial so
that the court no longer had evidence before it on which to base an
acquittal. 7 The supreme court, however, concluded that the trial
judge had the power to correct errors and to substitute a judgment
a directed verdict
of acquittal despite his previous refusal to enter
76
for the defendant at the close of evidence.
The supreme court also upheld the judgment of acquittal because a retrial on the murder charge would have subjected the defendant to a double jeopardy. 77 Although a mistrial because of a
deadlocked jury normally does not bar retrial, the proscription
against double jeopardy bars retrial if the evidence adduced at trial
was insufficient to convict the defendant. 71 In Crilly, the trial
judge determined, as a matter of law, that the State had presented
insufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of murder. 179 Accordingly, the supreme court reasoned that double jeopardy principles precluded the State from retrying the defendant on
the murder charge.1 0
B. Double Jeopardy at Sentencing
In two capital cases, the supreme court considered double jeopardy issues regarding sentencing. In People v. Davis,'8 ' the Illinois
Supreme Court held that an earlier decision vacating a death sen172. Id. at 304, 483 N.E.2d at 1237.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 305, 483 N.E.2d at 1237.
175. Id. at 305, 483 N.E.2d at 1237-38.
176. Id. at 311, 483 N.E.2d at 1240-41. The court stated, "It would be absurd to
suppose that trial judges who conclude they have made mistakes should not be permitted
to correct them within an appropriate time frame." Id. at 311, 483 N.E.2d at 1240. The
court also noted that this power to correct errors is equivalent to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) which permits a trial judge to enter a judgment of acquittal when a
jury is discharged without having returned a verdict. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c)).
177. Crilly, 108 Ill. 2d at 311, 483 N.E.2d at 1240-41.
178. Id. at 308, 483 N.E.2d at 1239.
179. Id. at 311-12, 483 N.E.2d at 1241.
180. Id.
181. 112 Ill. 2d 78, 491 N.E.2d 1163 (1986).

1986]

Criminal Procedure

tence for trial error did not preclude a second capital sentencing
hearing. 82 The court determined that double jeopardy barred a
second capital sentencing hearing when the State failed in the first
sentencing proceeding to prove the existence of any of the statutory
aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence. 83
Because the earlier death sentence in Davis had been vacated as a
result of errors at the sentencing hearing rather than because of
evidentiary insufficiency, the court held that the defendant could
be sentenced to death at the second capital
sentencing hearing
1 84
without any violation of double jeopardy.
The court reached a similar conclusion in People v. Szabo.I85 In
John Szabo's initial appeal, 8 6 the Illinois Supreme Court had reversed his death sentence because the trial court improperly excluded a prospective juror from the jury. 187 On remand, the
defendant was sentenced to death. 88 Szabo again appealed, arguing that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Davis
v. Georgia189 barred the State from obtaining a death sentence. 90
In Davis v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that when a trial court
improperly excluded a person from a jury, any "subsequently imposed death penalty [could not] stand."' 9 ' Szabo argued that Davis
182. Id. at 83, 491 N.E.2d at 1165.
183. Id. at 81, 491 N.E.2d at 1164 (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203
(1984)(double jeopardy clause prohibited the State from sentencing the defendant to
death upon reconviction after an initial conviction set aside on appeal had resulted in a
life sentence); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981)(State was prohibited from
obtaining a death sentence on reconviction when the death penalty had been rejected in
the first conviction which was then set aside on appeal)).
184. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d at 86, 491 N.E.2d at 1167. Davis also suggested that the reversal of his death sentence operated as an acquittal because there was no factual finding at
the trial or sentencing hearing that Davis actually killed, attempted, or intended to kill or
use lethal force. Id. at 82, 491 N.E.2d at 1165. The defendant's argument was based on
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), which held that such a factual finding is required before the court can impose a death penalty. Id. at 797. The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, rejected Davis's argument and held that the Enmund proportionality
finding could await an ultimate affirmance by the Supreme Court of a death sentence.
Davis, 112 Ill. 2d at 83, 491 N.E.2d at 1165. The finding need not be made in the original
appeal once the court determines it will vacate the sentence and remand for further proceedings. Id. See Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 696-97 (1986)(factual finding required by Enmund need not take place in the trial court, but, rather, may be made on
review).
185. 113 Ill. 2d 83, 497 N.E.2d 995 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1330 (1987).
186. People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 447 N.E.2d 193 (1983).
187. Id. at 357, 447 N.E.2d at 207.
188. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d at 88, 497 N.E.2d at 996.
189. 419 U.S. 122 (1976).
190. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d at 88, 497 N.E.2d at 996.
191. Id. at 96, 497 N.E.2d at 1000 (quoting Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123
(1976)).
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forever barred the State from obtaining a future death penalty. 92
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, interpreted Davis to require
only that a 9new
venire be drawn and a new sentencing hearing be
3
conducted.
VII.

A.

JURY SELECTION

Peremptory Challenges

In People v. Moss, 9 4 the court analyzed whether the trial court
erred in prohibiting the defendant from exercising a peremptory
challenge. "I Prior to jury selection in Moss, the judge advised opposing counsel that, once a side passed upon a panel of four prospective jurors and tendered the panel to the other side, the side
tendering the panel would not be allowed to challenge a juror previously tendered. 96 In contravention of the trial court's order, the
defense attempted to challenge a juror from a panel it previously
had tendered. 97 The trial court denied the request to excuse the
juror. 19 On appeal, the supreme court approved the trial court's
ruling, holding that the court had discretion'99 to alter the usual
procedure for peremptory challenges if the parties had adequate
notice and were not unduly restricted in the use of challenges.2°°
Accordingly, the court ruled that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by designating when a peremptory challenge could be
exercised.2 ° '
192. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d at 96, 497 N.E.2d at 1000.
193. Id. The Szabo court stated, "we do not think that the Supreme Court meant to
forever preclude the imposition of the death penalty because of a single error." Id. at 96,
497 N.E.2d at 1001.
194. 108 Ill. 2d 270, 483 N.E.2d 1252 (1985).
195. Id. at 273, 483 N.E.2d at 1253.
196. Id. at 273, 483 N.E.2d at 1254. The practice by which a counsel challenges a
juror whom he previously tendered is known as backstriking. Id. at 275, 483 N.E.2d at
1255.
197. Id. at 273, 483 N.E.2d at 1254.
198. Id.
199. The court in Moss noted that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 434(a) provided the
basis for the court's discretion. Id. at 275, 483 N.E.2d at 1255 (citing ILL. S. CT. R.
434(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 434(a)(1985)). Supreme Court Rule 434(a)
states, "in criminal cases, the parties shall pass and accept the jury in panels of four,
commencing with the state unless the court in its discretion directs otherwise." ILL. S.
Cr. R. 434(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 434(a)(1985). This rule permits use of
traditional procedures such as backstriking in exercising peremptory challenges unless
the court directs otherwise. Moss, 108 Ill. 2d at 275, 483 N.E.2d at 1255 (citing People v.
Robinson, 121 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1012, 460 N.E.2d 392, 399 (lst Dist. 1984)).
200. Moss, 108 I11. 2d at 275, 483 N.E.2d at 1255.
201. Id.
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B.

Fair Cross-Section of Community

In People v. Free,2 the court considered whether a defendant's
sixth amendment right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section
of the community was violated because a federal court, in an unrelated civil case, 2°3 had found that discriminatory housing practices
existed in the county from which the defendant's venire was chosen. 20 4 On appeal of a murder conviction and a resulting death
sentence, the defendant, James Free, argued that the discriminatory housing policies in DuPage County unconstitutionally tainted
the venire by eliminating minority and low income citizens from
the jury pool. 205 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, held that
an adjudication that discriminatory housing practices existed in a
county did not mandate reversal of the convictions of all defendants tried in that county. 2°6 The court reasoned that the fair crosssection requirement was not violated because the defendant could
not establish that under-representation of racial minorities and low
income groups on the venire resulted from the systematic exclusion
in the jury selection process.20 7
C. Manner and Scope of Voir Dire
In People v. Stack,2 °8 the court determined that the trial court
committed reversible error by denying a murder defendant's request to ask prospective jurors if they had any feelings or viewpoints concerning the insanity defense in a criminal case when the
202. 112 Ill. 2d 154, 492 N.E.2d 1269, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 246 (1986).
203. Hope, Inc. v, County of DuPage, 717 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1983).
204. Id. at 163-64, 492 N.E.2d at 1273. The sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed...." U.S. CONST. amend VI. In Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that a jury is not
constituted properly "if the jury pool is made up of only segments of the populace or if
large distinctive groups are excluded from the pool." Id. at 530.
205. Free, 112 Ill. 2d at 163-64, 492 N.E.2d at 1273.
206. Id. at 165, 492 N.E.2d at 1273.
207. Id. at 164, 492 N.E.2d at 1273. The court concluded that Free could not satisfy
the three-step test formulated by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether
the fair cross-section requirement had been violated. Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). Under this test, the defendant must prove the following:
[T]he group which the defendant claims was excluded from his venire must be a
distinctive group in the community; representation of this group was not fair
and reasonable in proportion to the population of the community; and lastly,
the disproportionate representation resulted from systematic exclusion of the
group in the jury selection process.
Id.
208. 112 Ill. 2d 301, 493 N.E.2d 339, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 236 (1986).
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defendant had asserted that defense. 20 9 Reasoning that the insanity

defense was well-recognized but controversial, the court held that a
defendant's right to an impartial jury would not be protected completely when voir dire questioning on the insanity defense involved
only whether a juror generally would follow the court's instructions on insanity. 210 Thus, to probe effectively for juror bias, the
court held that additional specific questions were required concerning the insanity defense. l1
In People v. Bowel, 21 2 the Illinois Supreme Court reached a different result on an issue similar to that in Stack. In Bowel, the
court rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court's refusal to
ask prospective jurors questions concerning mistaken identification
denied his right to an impartial jury. 213 Distinguishing mistaken
identification from the insanity defense, the court held that mistaken identification was not a subject about which prospective jurors would harbor predetermined viewpoints.21 4 Rather, the court
noted that the claim of mistaken identification depended on the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence; therefore, no specific questions probing for bias against that claim were
necessary.215
In People v. Britz,2 16 the court again considered an issue related
to questioning during voir dire. In Britz, the defendant, John
Britz, argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow questions concerning the presumption of innocence, the State's burden
of proof, and the privilege against self-incrimination. 217 People v.
209. Id. at 313, 493 N.E.2d at 344-45.
210. Id. at 313, 493 N.E.2d at 344. The court stated that the defendant's right to
identify and challenge prospective jurors who would refuse to apply the law regarding the
insanity defense was analogous to the State's right to probe the venire for jurors who
would not follow the law regarding the death penalty in a capital case. Id. See People v.
Wright, 111I11. 2d 128, 490 N.E.2d 640 (1985)(State may ask potential jurors if they
would be able to impose the death sentence if it was supported by the law or facts in a
case). The Stack court stated that, although Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234 prohibited
questions on voir dire directly or indirectly concerning matters of law or instruction, the
question at issue did not violate Rule 234. Stack, 112 Ill. 2d at 311, 493 N.E.2d at 344
(citing ILL. S. CT. R. 234, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 234 (1985)). The question
sought only to assess juror bias against the insanity defense. Stack, 112 Ill. 2d at 311, 493
N.E.2d at 344. For the text of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234, see infra note 219.
211. Stack, 112 Ill. 2d at 313, 493 N.E.2d at 344.
212. 111 Ill. 2d 58, 488 N.E.2d 995 (1986).
213. Id. at 64-65, 488 N.E.2d at 998-99.
214. Id. at 65, 488 N.E.2d at 999.
215. Id.
216. 112 Ill. 2d 314, 493 N.E.2d 575 (1986).
217. Id. at 318, 493 N.E.2d at 576.
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Zehr,21 8 decided by the Illinois Supreme Court subsequent to the
trial in Britz, held that questions substantially similar to those
asked in Britz should have been addressed to prospective jurors.219
The Illinois Supreme Court in Britz, however, held that Zehr
would not be applied retroactively to the review of any conviction
prior to the Zehr ruling.22 °
In People v. Porter,22 ' the defendant, Anthony Porter, contended
that the trial court erred by failing to ask prospective jurors
whether they knew any of the parties, victims, or their families.222
After the Porterjury reached its verdict, it was discovered that a
member of the jury knew the mother of one of the victims.

223

Be-

cause Porter's counsel had not requested the trial court to ask these
questions during voir dire, the supreme court held that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury.224
In People ex rel. Daley v. Hett,225 the Illinois Supreme Court

held that when a defendant in a capital case waives his right to a
sentencing jury prior to the determination of guilt or innocence,
218. 103 Ill. 2d 472, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984).
219. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d at 318, 493 N.E.2d at 576 (citing Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 469
N.E.2d 1062 (1984)). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234 states:
The court shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors by putting to them questions it thinks appropriate touching their qualifications to
serve as jurors in the case on trial. The court may permit the parties to submit
additional questions to it for further inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate, or
may permit the parties to supplement the examination by such direct inquiry as
the court deems proper. Questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions.
ILL. S. CT. R. 234, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 234 (1985).
The defendant in Britz was denied the right to ask the following questions: "(1)
whether the jurors understood that the defendant was presumed to be innocent of the
charge; (2) whether the jurors understood that the defendant need not produce any evidence; (3) whether the jurors could return a verdict of not guilty if the prosecution failed
to prove each and every element of the offense." Britz, 112 Ill. 2d at 318, 493 N.E.2d at
576-77. The Zehr decision changed Illinois law by granting the trial court discretion to
permit such questions in voir dire. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d at 319, 493 N.E.2d at 877.
220. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d at 319, 493 N.E.2d at 577. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed Britz on grounds unrelated to Zehr and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at
321, 493 N.E.2d at 578. Consequently, the holding in Zehr will be applied at Britz's new
trial. For a discussion of the grounds for reversal, see supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text. Id.
221. 111 Ill. 2d 386, 489 N.E.2d 1329, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 298 (1986).
222. Id. at 401, 489 N.E.2d at 1335.
223. Id. at 402, 489 N.E.2d at 1335.
224. Id. at 401-02, 489 N.E.2d at 1335. The defense counsel could have submitted
supplemental questions to the court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 234. ILL. S. CT. R.
234, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 234 (1985). For the text of Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 234, see supra note 219.
225. 113 Ill. 2d 75, 495 N.E.2d 513 (1986). See infra notes 385-92 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Hett's significance regarding sentencing in a death penalty case.
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the State is precluded from asking prospective jurors about their
views on the death penalty.226 Because the trial jurors would not
consider the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty, their
views on the death penalty were irrelevant to their fitness to serve
as trial jurors.227
In People v. Neal,228 the defendant, Johnny Neal, contended that
the trial court erred by failing to question each prospective juror
outside the presence of the other prospective jurors. 229

Noting

that Illinois Supreme Court Rules 431 and 234 permit, but do not
require, a trial judge to conduct voir dire out of the presence of
other jurors, the Neal court concluded that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion because he took proper precautions to prevent
juror prejudice, and because an individualized voir dire was impracticable as a result of a lack of security and appropriate
facilities.23°
VIII.
A.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Several decisions during the Survey period examined the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel.231 In four cases, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the defendant had been denied ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In People v. Hattery, 32 the defendant, Charles Hattery, who had
entered a not guilty plea to a murder charge, claimed that his trial
counsel's conduct amounted to a guilty plea and therefore constituted per se ineffective assistance of counsel.233 At trial, Hattery's
counsel stated, "[a]t the end of your deliberations, you will find
226. Hett, 113 Ill. 2d at 82, 495 N.E.2d at 516-17. In a capital case, the state is
permitted to ask potential jurors if they would be able to vote for the death penalty.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1968).
227. Hett, 113 Ill. 2d at 82, 495 N.E.2d at 516-17.
228. 111 Ill. 2d 180, 489 N.E.2d 845 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2292 (1986).
229. Id. at 197-98, 489 N.E.2d at 852.
230. Id. (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 234, 431, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, paras. 234, 431
(1985)). Rule 431 states, "In criminal cases the voir dire examination of jurors shall be
conducted in accordance with Rule 234." ILL. S. CT. R. 431, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A,
para. 431 (1985). For the text of Rule 234, see supra note 219.
231. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme
Court announced a two-part test for judging actual ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 690-94. Second, the defendant must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id.
232. 109 Ill. 2d 449, 488 N.E.2d 513 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3314 (1986).
233. Id. at 458, 488 N.E.2d at 516.
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[the defendant] guilty of murder. The question and the only question facing you will be whether to impose the death penalty on
'
Charles Hattery for trying to save the life of his family." 234
Because Hattery's counsel did not present the issue of his guilt or
innocence to the jury, the supreme court held that Hattery had
been denied effective assistance of counsel.2 35 The court predicated
this result on the following factors: the defense counsel's actions
were at odds with Hattery's plea of not guilty; the record did not
contain evidence that Hattery consented to counsel's actions; and
the trial counsel should have held the prosecution to its burden of
36
2

proof.

The Illinois Supreme Court also concluded there was ineffective
assistance of counsel in People v. Correa.23 There, the defendant,
Cesar Correa, entered guilty pleas to several charges pursuant to a
plea agreement.238 Prior to the agreement, Correa had asked his
attorney whether the pleas would affect his status as an immigrant.2 39 The attorney responded that, because Correa's wife was a
United States citizen, the pleas would not affect his status.

210

The

attorney's advice was incorrect - after Correa's release, the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service took Correa
into custody and ordered him deported on the basis of the convic" ' Thereafter, Correa sought and was granted post-convictions.24
tion relief.24 2 Concluding that the attorney's advice in response to
Correa's specific questions was "not within the range of competence required of counsel in such situations,

' 24 3

the supreme court

held that Correa had been denied effective assistance of counsel. 2 "
In People v. Wright,245 the defendant, Hazel Wright, contended
234. Id. at 458-59, 488 N.E.2d at 516.
235. Id. at 464-65, 488 N.E.2d at 519.
236. Id. at 464-65, 488 N.E.2d at 519 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984)). Cronic held that, at a minimum, defendant's counsel must act as a true advocate
for the accused. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. If the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the sixth amendment guarantee is violated. Id. at 656-57.
237. 108 Ill. 2d 541, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985).
238. Id. at 547, 485 N.E.2d at 309.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 548, 485 N.E.2d at 309.
241. Id. at 544, 485 N.E.2d at 308.
242. Id. The trial court granted the petition and the Illinois appellate court affirmed.
Id.
243. Id. at 553, 485 N.E.2d at 313 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 77071 (1970)).
244. Correa, 109 Ill. 2d at 553, 485 N.E.2d at 312. See also People v. Morreale, 412
Ill.
528, 107 N.E.2d 721 (1952) (counsel misrepresented to defendant that if he pleaded
guilty he would receive a sentence of probation; the court held the plea was involuntary).
245. I111ll. 2d 18, 488 N.E.2d 973 (1986).
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that she was denied effective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to present a voluntary intoxication defense to the
crime of murder.246 Wright claimed that when she awoke from an
alcohol-induced sleep, she heard noises and began to investigate,
forgetting that her daughter was in her home.247 While Wright
stood at the top of the stairs, her daughter asked her why she was
carrying a gun. 248

At that point, the gun discharged, the bullet

striking her daughter.249
Subsequently, Wright sought post-conviction relief on the
ground that she was denied effective assistance of counsel because
her attorney failed to interpose a voluntary intoxication defense
and because her attorney should have pursued an involuntary manslaughter theory. 25 ° At the post-conviction hearing, Wright's trial
counsel stated that he thought that voluntary intoxication could be
used as a defense only if Wright had no recall of the alleged
crime.2

1

Because Wright remembered the shooting, the attorney

thought that he could not present a voluntary intoxication defense
or pursue the theory of involuntary manslaughter.252
The trial court, holding that Wright was denied effective assistance of counsel, granted post-conviction relief by vacating the murder conviction, entering judgment for involuntary manslaughter,
and reducing the sentence from twenty to five years.253 In granting
the petition, the trial court noted that it would have found Wright
guilty of involuntary manslaughter instead of murder had the postconviction evidence been
presented at trial. 254 The appellate court
255
affirmed the decision.

The supreme court held that an attorney's decision to raise a
specific defense usually is a matter of trial strategy and does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.256 The court, however,
246. Id. at 26, 488 N.E.2d at 977. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-3(a) (1985), states
in pertinent part, "a person who is in intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally responsible for conduct unless such condition . . . negates the existence of a mental state
which is an element of the defense." Id.
247. Wright, 111 111. 2d at 22, 488 N.E.2d at 975.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 26, 488 N.E.2d at 977.
251. Id. at 23, 488 N.E.2d at 975.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 24-25, 488 N.E.2d at 976.
254. Id. at 31, 488 N.E.2d at 979.
255. Id. at 21, 488 N.E.2d at 975.
256. Id. at 26-27, 488 N.E.2d at 977 (citing People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 122, 402
N.E.2d 203, 212 (1980); People v. Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 540, 543-44, 413 N.E.2d 410, 412
(1980)).
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ruled that the defense counsel's decision not to present a voluntary
intoxication defense was based not on trial strategy but, rather, on
a misunderstanding of the law.2 7 Because the counsel's error concerned a matter central to the case, and because the result of trial
would have been different but for the error, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that Wright had been denied
effective assistance of counsel.258
People v. Weir2 59 presents another instance in which the defendant argued that his attorney's failure to raise a voluntary intoxication defense denied him the effective assistance of counsel.2 ° In
Weir, the defendant, Leonard Weir, was convicted of unlawful use
of a weapon and aggravated assault for firing a gun at a law enforcement officer.2 61 In response to an interrogatory, Weir's counsel stated that the defendant's consumption of alcohol on the day
in question would be presented for purposes of mitigation, but not
as a defense.262
Following the appellate court's holding that Weir had been denied effective assistance of counsel, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed because Weir had failed to show a reasonable probability
that a defense of intoxication would have succeeded.263 The
supreme court noted that the evidence supported a finding that
Weir acted knowingly, thus showing the mental state necessary for
his convictions. 26 Consequently, the court held that Weir was not
denied effective assistance of counsel because the trial counsel's error was not prejudicial.265
In People v. Walker,266 the defendant claimed that he was denied
257. Wright, 111 111. 2d at 27, 488 N.E.2d at 977-78.
258. Id. at 31, 488 N.E.2d at 979-80.
259. 111 Ill. 2d 334, 490 N.E.2d 1 (1986).
260. Id. at 335, 490 N.E.2d at 1. For the statutory language of the defense of voluntary intoxication, see supra note 246.
261. Id. at 336, 490 N.E.2d at 2.
262. Id. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)(a defendant asserting a
denial of effective assistance of counsel must show both that counsel's performance fell
below accepted professional norms and that defendant suffered prejudice from that deficient performance). Accord People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449, 488 N.E.2d 513 (1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3314 (1986).
263. Weir, 111 111. 2d at 339-40, 490 N.E.2d at 3. The court noted that the degree of
Weir's impairment was disputed and, at both trial and sentencing, the trial judge discounted the evidence of intoxication. Id. at 339, 490 N.E.2d at 3.
264. Id. at 340, 490 N.E.2d at 3-4.
265. Id. at 340, 490 N.E.2d at 4. The court stated that in a narrow range of cases, a
defendant need not show actual prejudice, but stated, "[w]e decline to presume that the
defendant necessarily was prejudiced by counsel's belief that intoxication could not be
raised here as a defense to the charges." Id. at 338, 490 N.E.2d at 3.
266. 109 Ill. 2d 484, 488 N.E.2d 529 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 598 (1986).
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effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not advise
him of the possible plea of "guilty but mentally ill."' 267 The court
rejected this claim, holding that Walker made no showing that the
result at trial was likely to have been different had counsel advised
him of the plea.268
B.

Conflict of Interest

In People v. Griffin,269 the defendant, Lee Griffin, argued that his
attorney's joint representation of him and his co-defendant created
a conflict of interest which violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. 27 0 At trial, Griffin had testified to a common alibi for himself and his co-defendant.2 1 At a subsequent
post-conviction hearing, however, Griffin recanted this testimony,
explaining that he had testified falsely to the alibi because his counsel discouraged him from testifying that he was present at the scene
of the crime but that he did not participate in its commission. 2
On appeal, the supreme court determined that Griffin had failed
to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest. 273 The court also held
that, in denying Griffin's post-conviction petition, the circuit court
properly had exercised its discretion to determine the credibility
and weight of Griffin's testimony.2 74 Moreover, the court stated,
"[I]t would seem incongruous to permit a defendant to perjure
himself, and then benefit from that perjury by successfully contending that his attorney, because of the perjury, did not most effectively explore grounds for his advantage. 2 75 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the trial court's findings were not manifestly
erroneous and that the appellate court erred in reversing the denial
of the post-conviction petition.276
267. Id. at 503, 488 N.E.2d at 537. Walker also argued that, in his post-trial motion,
his attorney failed to raise the issue of the trial court's inaccurate admonition concerning
the plea of guilty but mentally ill. Id. For further discussion of this issue, see supra notes
107-17 and accompanying text.
268. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d at 504, 488 N.E.2d at 537.
269. 109 Ill. 2d 293, 487 N.E.2d 599 (1985).
270. Id. at 302, 487 N.E.2d at 602.
271. Id. at 299, 487 N.E.2d at 601.
272. Id. at 303, 487 N.E.2d at 603. The Griffin court cited People v. Washington,
101 II1. 2d 104, 112, 461 N.E.2d 393, 397, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1022 (1984), for the
proposition that when a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on joint
representation, evidence of an actual conflict must be shown. Griffin, 109 Ill. 2d at 303,
487 N.E.2d at 603.
273. Griffin, 109 I11.2d at 302, 487 N.E.2d at 603.
274. Id. at 305-306, 487 N.E.2d at 604.
275. Id. at 306, 487 N.E.2d at 604.
276. Id. at 307, 487 N.E.2d at 605.
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The defendant in People v. Cunningham2 7 7 also claimed that his
attorney's representation of another defendant created a conflict of
interest which deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.278 In
Cunningham, the State used separate informations to charge the
defendant, Edward Cunningham, his stepson, and his step-grandson with different incidents of indecent liberties with the same
child. 279 The same public defender represented the three defend-

ants.28 After the stepson and the step-grandson entered negotiated pleas of guilty, the public defender informed the court that a
potential conflict of interest existed because the State listed the
stepson and step-grandson as potential witnesses against
Cunningham.28 '
Although the three men were not tried together, Cunningham
argued that the representation by the public defender of two persons who might have been called as witnesses at Cunningham's
trial created a per se conflict of interest.2 2 The court rejected this
argument and held that the defendant was required to demonstrate
that an actual conflict of interest occurred at trial.28 a Because the
representation of the other men had not inhibited Cunningham's
defense in any way, the court ruled that the defendant failed to
satisfy the conflict of interest standard.284
In People v. Free,281 the court considered whether an attorney's
prior representation in an unrelated matter of an adverse witness at
the defendant's preliminary hearing created a per se conflict of interest.286 In Free, the court appointed a public defender to represent the defendant, James Free, on a post-conviction petition.287
While familiarizing himself with the trial record, the public defender discovered that a witness who had testified adversely to Free
at a pre-trial hearing previously had been the attorney's client.288
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the circumstances had not
created a per se conflict of interest because the professional rela277. 107 Ill. 2d 143, 481 N.E.2d 722 (1985).
278. Id. at 148-49, 481 N.E.2d at 725.
279. Id. at 146, 481 N.E.2d at 723.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 146-47, 481 N.E.2d at 724.
282. Id. at 147, 481 N.E.2d at 724.
283. Id. (citing Washington, 101 Ill. 2d at 112, 461 N.E.2d at 397).
284. Griffin, 109 Ill. 2d at 150, 481 N.E.2d at 725.
285. 112 Ill. 2d 154, 492 N.E.2d 1269, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 246 (1986).
286. Id. at 166, 492 N.E.2d at 1274.
287. Id.
288. Id. That witness did not testify at trial because the trial court had suppressed
his statements. Id. at 167, 492 N.E.2d at 1274.
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tionship between the public defender and Free had not occurred
simultaneously with the relationship between the public defender
and the adverse witness.289 In addition, the court held that Free
had not established actual prejudice resulting from a conflict of
interest and, therefore, it rejected Free's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.29 °
People v. Olinger29 ' addressed whether the defendant, Perry
Olinger, had waived the right to recourse for a potential conflict
between himself and his attorney. In Olinger, the trial court informed Olinger that his attorney had been investigated for witness
tampering and thereafter advised Olinger of the ramifications of
the potential conflict of interest.2 92 After the State informed the
trial court that it did not plan to pursue a criminal prosecution of
the attorney, Olinger advised the court that he consented to continued representation by the attorney.293
On appeal, Olinger argued that his waiver was invalid because
the trial court had failed to inform him that the attorney could be
subjected to disciplinary proceedings. 294 The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, concluded that Olinger had waived his right to
conflict-free counsel. 295 Although the court noted that the waiver
would have been ineffective if the defendant had not been advised
of the conflict and its significance, it also noted that the trial court
did not have to "engage in counseling with the defendant. ' 296 Because Olinger understood the general nature of the conflict, the
trial court did not have a duty to explain every possible consequence of the conflict. 297 The trial court's admonishments had sufficiently apprised Olinger
of the potential for conflict; accordingly,
298
his waiver was valid.
289. Id. at 168, 492 N.E.2d at 1275 (citing People v. Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d 147, 402
N.E.2d 157 (1979); People v. Strohl, 118 I11.
App. 3d 1084, 1092, 456 N.E.2d 276, 280
(4th Dist. 1983)). The adverse witness's testimony was suppressed before Free's trial and
the public defender did not undertake the representation of Free until the post-conviction
petition was filed. Free, 112 Ill. 2d at 169, 492 N.E.2d at 1275.
290. Free, 112 Ill. 2d at 169, 492 N.E.2d at 1275.
291. 112 Ill. 2d 324, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1329 (1987).
292. Id. at 338-39, 493 N.E.2d at 586.
293. Id. at 339, 493 N.E.2d at 586.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 340, 493 N.E.2d at 587. The court cited Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 483 n.5 (1977), for the proposition that the right to conflict-free counsel can be
waived.
296. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d at 339, 493 N.E.2d at 587.
297. Id. at 339-40, 493 N.E.2d at 587.
298. Id. at 340, 493 N.E.2d at 587.
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IX.

IMPARTIAL TRIAL

A. Procedures at Trial
In People v. Griffin,299 the defendant, Lee Griffin, argued that
testimony of a State's witness was misleading and caused him unfair prejudice.3 " At trial, the witness, Charles Kellick, testified
that he had criminal charges pending against him but did not have
an agreement with the State regarding the disposition of those
charges.3 01 On appeal, Griffin asserted that Kellick's testimony
was false because the prosecutor had told Kellick's counsel that he
would "observe" Kellick's "cooperation" at Griffin's trial and consider it in arriving at a plea bargain, but that any understanding
between them would be cancelled if the attorney conveyed the arrangement to Kellick. 30 2 Because Kellick was unaware of the conversation between his lawyer and the prosecutor, the court found
that Kellick had not misled the jury.3"3 Accordingly, the court rejected Griffin's argument that he had been prejudiced by Kellick's
testimony.
The defendant in People v. Coates3 asserted that he was denied
a fair trial because the trial court had conducted an in camera inspection of confidential Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") records. 3 5 After inspecting the records outside the
presence of counsel, the trial court permitted the defendant, Rocky
Coates, to use certain portions for purposes of impeaching his
wife.30 6 On appeal, the supreme court determined that this proce299. 109 Ill. 2d 293, 487 N.E.2d 599 (1985).
300. Id. at 307, 487 N.E.2d at 605.
301. Id. at 297, 487 N.E.2d at 600.
302. Id. at 308, 487 N.E.2d at 605.
303. Id.
304. 109 Ill. 2d 431, 488 N.E.2d 247 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1474 (1986).
305. Id. at 437, 488 N.E.2d at 249. Coates argued that the action violated the sixth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, sections 2 and 8 of article
I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, and provisions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412(h).
Id. Rule 412(h) states in relevant part: "upon a showing of materiality to the preparation
of the defense, and if the request is reasonable, the court in its discretion may require
disclosure to defense counsel of relevant material and information not covered by this
rule." ILL. S. CT. R. 412(h), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 412(h)(1985).

306. Coates, 109 Ill. 2d at 437, 488 N.E.2d at 249. The Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act provides:
All records concerning reports of child abuse and neglect and all records generated as a result of such reports, shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed
except as specifically authorized by this Act or other applicable law. It is a
Class A misdemeanor to permit, assist, or encourage the unauthorized release
of any information contained in such reports or records.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2061.1, § 11 (1985). The Act further provides:
A person shall have access to the records described in Section 11 only in fur-
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dure was acceptable because defense counsel has no right to be
present during an in camera inspection. 0 7
In dissent, Justice Simon argued that the procedure whereby the
circuit court judge examined the DCFS records without the benefit
of counsel's insight, and then determined which documents were
relevant, did not adequately safeguard the defendant's interests.3 ° s
Justice Simon noted that a judge "cannot be expected to vigorously
advance [the] defendant's interests from his position of judicial
neutrality." 309
In People v. Allen,3 1 ° the appellate court reversed the defendant's
attempt armed robbery conviction because the trial judge misstated
the law when reading an attempt armed robbery instruction to the
jury. 3 1 The State contended that the trial judge had stated the law
correctly
but that the transcript of the trial proceedings was inaccurate. 3 2 The supreme court remanded to the trial court for contherance of purposes directly connected with the administration of this Act.
Such persons and purposes for access include:
(7) A court, upon its finding that access to such records may be necessary for
the determination of an issue before such court; however, such access shall be
limited to in camera inspection, unless the court determines that public disclosure of the information contained therein is necessary for the resolution of an
issue then pending before it; ....
Id. at para. 2061.1(7).
307. Coates, 109 Ill. 2d at 437, 488 N.E.2d at 249. The court held that People v.
Dace, 104 Ill. 2d 96, 470 N.E.2d 993 (1984), and People v. Phipps, 98 I11.App. 3d 413,
424 N.E.2d 727 (4th Dist. 1981), aff'd, 104 Ill. 2d 96, 470 N.E.2d 993 (1984), were
distinguishable from Coates. Coates, 109 III. 2d at 437, 488 N.E. at 249. Those cases
concerned whether mental health records of prosecution witnesses were discoverable for
impeachment purposes and held that, if either the witness or therapist attempted to invoke the statutory privilege, the court had to conduct an in camera hearing in the presence of both sides. Id. at 437-38, 488 N.E.2d at 249.
The defendant in Coates also argued that the court erred by failing to make a record of
the in camera proceedings and by failing to preserve the records involved. Id. at 438, 488
N.E.2d at 250. Because the defendant failed to request such action, the court held that
the issue was waived. Id.
308. Coates, 109 Ill. 2d at 443, 488 N.E.2d at 252 (Simon, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 445, 488 N.E.2d at 253 (Simon, J., dissenting).
310. 109 Ill. 2d 177, 486 N.E.2d 873 (1985).
311. Id. at 180, 486 N.E.2d 873.
312. Id. The State asserted that the trial judge had given a correct attempt armed
robbery instruction, as reflected in the common law record which stated: "To sustain the
charge of attempt, the State must prove the following propositions: ... Third: That the
defendant did not act under compulsion." Id. at 181, 486 N.E.2d at 873. The transcript
of proceedings, however, contained the following incorrect instruction: "To sustain the
charge of attempt, the State must prove the following propositions: ... Third: That the
defendant, or one for whose conduct she is legally responsible, did not act under compulsion." Id. (emphasis added).
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sideration of the State's claim. 3 13 At a hearing conducted by the

trial court, the State presented the original stenographic notes of
the proceedings and oral testimony of the stenographer.3 4 Additionally, the State presented the written jury instructions given to
the jurors.3153 16These instructions did not contain the alleged
misstatement.

Viewing the record as a whole, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the trial judge did not misstate the law and that the
original transcript of proceedings contained an error.31 7 Because
fundamental fairness did not require a defendant to escape conviction because of a court reporter's error, the supreme court affirmed
Allen's conviction for armed robbery.31 8
In People v. Olinger,3 19 the defendant, Perry Olinger, asserted
that he had been deprived of a fair trial in two regards. 32 ° First,
Olinger argued that, after the State introduced inculpatory portions of statements he had made to the police and grand jury, he
should have been permitted to introduce the exculpatory portions
" ' The court rejected Olinger's argument,
of those statements.32
holding that additional portions of the statements should have
313. Id. at 182, 486 N.E.2d at 874.
314. Id. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court for the purposes of
conducting a hearing pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 329 which states in part:
"any controversy as to whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the trial
court shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to
the truth." 109 Ill. 2d at 182, 486 N.E.2d at 874 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 329, ILL. REV.
STAT. Ch. I 10A, para. 329 (1985)).
315. Allen, 109 Ill. 2d at 184, 486 N.E.2d at 875.
316. Id. at 185, 486 N.E.2d at 875. The appellate court denied the State's motion for
leave to supplement the record. Id. The original record had not contained the written
jury instructions and the appellate court did not consider these instructions on appeal.
Id. Thus, the instructions were not a part of the official record on appeal when leave to
appeal to the supreme court was granted. Id.
317. Id. at 187, 486 N.E.2d at 876. The Illinois Supreme Court made the written
instructions part of the record, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(3). Id. at
186, 486 N.E.2d at 876 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 366(a)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para.
366(a)(3)(1985)). The mistake in the record was corrected pursuant to Rule 329 which
states: "Material omissions or inaccuracies or improper authentication may be corrected
...by the trial court, either before or after the record is transmitted to the reviewing
court .... " Allen, 109 Ill. 2d at 185, 486 N.E.2d at 875 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 329, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 329 (1985)).
318. Allen, 109 Ill. 2d at 187, 486 N.E.2d at 876. The court determined there was no
error in the instructions that were given. Id. at 186, 486 N.E.2d at 876.
319. 112 Ill. 2d 324, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1329 (1987).
320. Id. at 332, 493 N.E.2d at 583.
321. Id. at 337, 493 N.E.2d at 585. Olinger argued that under People v. Weaver, 92
Ill. 2d 545, 442 N.E.2d 255 (1982), when the State introduces part of a statement into
evidence, a defendant has the right to introduce the rest of that statement. Olinger, 112
Ill. 2d at 337, 493 N.E.2d at 585.
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been admitted only if necessary to prevent the jury from receiving
a misleading impression about the portions of the statements introduced by the State.32 2 Because Olinger failed to indicate how the
statements in evidence had misled the jury, the supreme court held
that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the exculpatory
segments of the statements. 23
Second, Olinger objected to the court's refusal to allow the jury
to see transcripts of his trial testimony during its deliberations. 24
In Olinger,the jury sent a note to the judge, requesting transcripts.
The judge replied by stating, "[N]o, the transcripts are not available. You must rely on your memories. "325 On appeal, Olinger
relied upon People v. Queen 326 in which the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed because the trial judge, in refusing to allow the jury to
view transcripts, demonstrated that he did not realize that he had
discretion to show transcripts of trial testimony to the jury. 327 The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, distinguished the instant case
from Queen and held that the trial judge had not failed to exercise
his discretion.328
In People v. Crow, 3 2 9 the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that,
because the evidence that the defendant, Linda Crow, killed her
husband was totally circumstantial, the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury that every reasonable
theory of innocence had to be excluded by the facts proved before
the defendant could be convicted of murder. 330 The court further
322. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d at 338, 493 N.E.2d at 586.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 348, 493 N.E.2d at 591.
325. Id. at 349, 493 N.E.2d at 591.
326. 56 Ill. 2d 560, 310 N.E.2d 166 (1974).
327. Id. In Queen, the judge told the jury, "[Y]ou must decide on the basis of the
testimony heard in the courtroom. I cannot have any testimony of any witness read to
you." 112 Ill.
2d at 349, 493 N.E.2d at 591 (quoting Queen, 56 Ill. 2d, 560, 565, 310
N.E.2d 166, 169).
328. Olinger, 112 Ill.
2d at 349, 493 N.E.2d at 591.
329. 108 Ill. 2d 520, 485 N.E.2d 381 (1985).
330. Id. at 533, 536, 485 N.E.2d at 387-388. Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No.
3.02 states:
Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which give rise
to a reasonable inference of other facts which tend to show the guilt or innocence of [the] defendant. Circumstantial evidence should be considered by you
together with all the other evidence in the case in arriving at your verdict.
You should not find the defendant guilty unless the facts and circumstances
proved exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (IPI), Criminal 2d, No. 3.02 (1981).
The trial court refused to give the second paragraph of this instruction. Crow, 108 Ill.
2d at 522, 485 N.E.2d at 382.
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concluded that the failure to give the instruction was not
harmless.3 3 I
In People v. Bean,3 3 2 the supreme court held that the trial court
committed reversible error by denying the defendant's motion for
severance. 333 The court held that the defenses of Harold Bean and
his co-defendant, Robert Byron, were so antagonistic that their
joint prosecution deprived Bean of his right to a fair trial.334 The
court reasoned that Byron's testimony that Bean was the killer,
Byron's introduction of testimony damaging to Bean, and the adverse comments of Byron's counsel and the prosecutor about
Bean's failure to testify unfairly placed Bean in the position of hav335
ing to defend against both the State and his co-defendant.
B.

ProsecutorialMisconduct

In Bean, the Supreme Court also held that the prosecutor had
violated Bean's right to a fair trial.3 36 In closing argument, the
prosecutor stated, "[t]hey have put on a show for you of being one
opposed against the other in the hope that one would create reversible error for the other. '53 The court ruled that the prosecutor's
personal attack on the defense counsel deprived the defendant of
331. Crow, 108 Ill. 2d at 536, 485 N.E.2d at 389.
332. 109 Ill. 2d 80, 485 N.E.2d 349 (1985).
333. Id. at 97, 485 N.E.2d at 357. Under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-8 (1985),
the defendant may file a pretrial motion for severance. Id. The motion must explain how
the defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 92, 485 N.E.2d at
354-55. The decision whether to grant the motion is in the trial judge's discretion and
will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. Id. at 93, 485 N.E.2d at 355.
334. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 93, 485 N.E.2d at 355. Two situations require severance.
One occurs "[w]hen co-defendants' defenses are so antagonistic that one of the co-defendants cannot receive a fair trial jointly with the other." People v. Daugherty, 102 Ill. 2d
533, 541-42, 468 N.E.2d 969, 973 (1984). The other involves an interference with the
constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 134 n. 10 (1968).
335. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 94, 485 N.E.2d at 355. For further discussion of the selfincrimination issue, see supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text. In Bean, the State
argued that the defenses were not antagonistic because the co-defendants did not reciprocally blame each other, and when the co-defendant presented an alibi defense, Bean did
not say "I didn't do it, he did." Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 95, 485 N.E.2d at 356. The court
reasoned that the facts in Bean were similar to People v. Daugherty, 102 Ill. 2d 533, 468
N.E.2d 969 (1984), and People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 2 N.E.2d 839 (1939). Bean, 109
Ill. 2d at 94, 485 N.E.2d at 355. In both Daugherty and Braune, the court required
severance because the trial became adversarial between the defendants instead of between
the State and the defendants. Id.
336. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 91, 485 N.E.2d at 354.
337. Id. See People v. Weathers, 62 11. 2d 114, 338 N.E.2d 880 (1975)(improper
statements made to the jury by the prosecutor in rebuttal argument severely prejudiced
the defendant and required reversal of defendant's conviction).
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his right to present a defense to an unbiased jury.3 3 8 The court
concluded that the prosecutor's comments unfairly discredited
Bean's attorney, thus causing reversible error.339
In People v. Olinger,3 ° the defendant, Perry Olinger, argued that
the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory information to the
defense, as required by Brady v. Maryland.4 ' Olinger contended
that the State did not disclose the substance of a witness's statements that pointed to an alternative suspect for the murders for
which Olinger was convicted.342 Concluding that the statements
were neither exculpatory nor material, the supreme court held that
a Brady violation had not occurred.343 The court characterized the
evidence as inadmissible hearsay and emphasized that Olinger had
not referred to any admissible evidence that the statements would
have generated. 344 Thus, the
court held that the nondisclosure did
3 45
not cause reversible error.
X.

SENTENCING

A. Fines
People v. Maldonado346 considered whether the trial court must
examine the defendant's financial resources prior to imposing a
338. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 101, 485 N.E.2d at 359.
339. Id.
340. 112 Ill. 2d 324, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1329 (1987).
341. Id. at 342, 493 N.E.2d at 588 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). In
Brady, the court held that failure of the prosecutor to disclose material evidence favorable
to a defendant violated due process. 373 U.S. at 87.
342. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d at 342, 493 N.E.2d at 588. At the post-trial motion hearing,
the defense presented a witness who testified that he had been told by a friend that another person had been present at the time of certain murders, of which Olinger was convicted. Id.
343. Id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381 (1985)). InBagley, the
Court held that evidence is material only if there is a reasonable likelihood that had the
prosecution disclosed the evidence, the result of the trial would have been different. 105
S. Ct. at 3381.
344. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d at 342-43, 493 N.E.2d at 588.
345. Id. at 343, 493 N.E.2d at 588. See also People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 490
N.E.2d 640 (1985), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1327 (1987) (State's noncompliance with its
discovery obligations under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412 did not mandate reversal
when the evidence withheld was unfavorable to the defendant).
Olinger also argued that the prosecution improperly asked questions of a witness for
purposes of impeachment. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d at 340, 493 N.E.2d at 587. After certain
questions were asked by the prosecutor, he found out that he was mistaken as to the basis
of the questions and, therefore, he could not perfect the impeachment. Id. The court
held that the impeachment was improper, but that the curative instruction to the jury
regarding the prosecutor's error eliminated any possible prejudice that may have occurred. Id. at 341, 493 N.E.2d at 588.
346. 109 Ill. 2d 319, 487 N.E.2d 610 (1985).
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fine.34 7 The defendant, Antonio Maldonado, was convicted of resisting and obstructing a police officer and fined $250 for each conviction.3 48 Maldonado argued that the fines should be vacated
because they were imposed without a determination of his financial
resources and future ability to pay.3 4 9 The Illinois Supreme Court
rejected this contention and upheld the imposition of the fines.3 5 °
The court concluded that the trial court had complied with the
statutory requirement that it consider the financial resources of the
defendant. 3 5 ' Moreover, because the trial court's order imposing a
fine did not provide for times or methods of payment, the court
concluded that Maldonado's
ability to pay at the time of sentenc35 2
irrelevant.
was
ing
In dissent, Justice Ward stated that the legislature intended that
the trial court ascertain and consider the offender's available resources and future ability to pay before levying a fine. 353 The dissent contended that the statute was not satisfied merely by the
judge's awareness that Maldonado had an unspecified income.35 4
Furthermore, the trial court's ability to reduce or revoke a fine that
347. Id. at 321, 487 N.E.2d at 611. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-9l(d)(1)(1985), states, "In determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the
court shall consider the financial resources and future ability of the offender to pay the
fine." Id.
348. Maldonado, 109 Ill. 2d at 320, 487 N.E.2d at 610. The court also sentenced the
defendant to 90 days for obstructing a police officer and to 180 days for resisting a peace
officer. Id.
349. Id. at 321, 487 N.E.2d at 611.
350. Id. at 324, 487 N.E.2d at 612.
351. Id. at 324, 487 N.E.2d at 612. The court stated that the trial court had considered Maldonado's financial resources and future ability to pay the fine, as required by the
statute, when it stated, "I would note that the defendant has been gainfully employed,
and that, as testified, he's been on unemployment." Id.
The court cited People v. Pittman, 93 Ill. 2d 169, 442 N.E.2d 836 (1982), as analogous.
Maldonado, 109 Ill. 2d at 323, 487 N.E.2d at 612. In Pittman, the statute at issue required that, before a consecutive sentence could be imposed, the trial court had to be of
the opinion "that such a term [was] required to protect the public." Pittman, 93 Ill. 2d
169, 177-78, 442 N.E.2d 836. Thus, the court was required to have made a determination
in Pittman, and the Illinois Supreme Court held that the same requirement applied and
was satisifed in Maldonado. Maldonado, 109 Ill. 2d at 323, 487 N.E.2d at 612.
352. Maldonado, 109 Ill. 2d at 325, 487 N.E.2d at 613. The court further noted that
another statute provides protection for unintentional failure to pay a fine. Id. at 325, 487
N.E.2d at 613 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-9-3(c) (1985)). Paragraph 10059-3(c) states as follows:
If it appears that the default in the payment of a fine is not intentional under
paragraph (b) of this section, the court may enter an order allowing the offender
additional time for payment, reducing the amount of the fine or of each installment, or revoking the fine or the unpaid portion.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005- 9 -3(c) (1985).
353. Maldonado, 109 Ill. 2d at 326, 487 N.E.2d at 613 (Ward, J., dissenting).
354. Id. (Ward, J., dissenting).
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had been imposed arbitrarily did not justify the court's conclusion
that the defendant's ability to pay at the time of sentencing was
irrelevant. 5
B.

Extended Term Sentences

In People v. Morgan,356 the court held that the trial court erred
in imposing extended term sentences.357 In that case, the defendant, Samuel Morgan, was sentenced to death for murder and to an
extended term for aggravated kidnapping and rape.35 8 Affirming
the death sentence, but vacating the sentence for rape and aggravated kidnapping, the court held that exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior, one of the factors allowing imposition of an
extended sentence, had characterized the two murders committed
by Morgan but had not accompanied the aggravated kidnapping
and rape.3 59 Therefore, the supreme court concluded that brutal
and heinous circumstances of another crime could not be the basis
for extended term sentences for offenses not characterized by that
behavior. 36°
In People v. Harden,361 the defendant, Jimmie Harden, was convicted of armed robbery, a class X felony, and sentenced to an extended term of sixty years of incarceration.362 On appeal, Harden
asserted that an extended term sentence should not have been imposed because his other conviction was a federal conviction, rather
than an Illinois conviction.3 63 The court rejected Harden's argument, stating that the purpose of the extended term statute is "to
355. Id. (Ward, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion relied upon People v. Morrison, 111 111. App. 3d 997, 444 N.E.2d 1144 (3d Dist. 1983). Maldonado, 109 Ill. 2d at
325, 487 N.E.2d at 613. In Morrison, the appellate court held that the trial court did not
consider sufficiently the defendant's ability to pay the fine because there was no indication
of the amount of unemployment benefits the defendant received and no assessment of the
defendant's expenses. Morrison, 111 Ill App. 3d at 999, 444 N.E.2d at 1145.
356. 112 Ill. 2d 111, 492 N.E.2d 1303 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1329 (1987).
357. Id. at 149, 492 N.E.2d at 1320.
358. Id. at 121, 492 N.E.2d at 1306. Illinois law provides that a court may consider
as a reason to impose an extended term sentence the fact that defendant had been "convicted of any felony and the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-8-2 (1985).
359. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d at 149, 492 N.E.2d at 1320.
360. Id.
361. 113 Ill. 2d 14, 495 N.E.2d 490 (1986).
362. Id. at 16, 495 N.E.2d at 491. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 18-2, § 5-53.2(b)(l)(1985)(a sentence for an extended term may be imposed "[w]hen a defendant is
convicted of any felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois of the same or
greater class felony within ten years").
363. Harden, 113 I11.
2d at 20-21, 495 N.E.2d at 493.
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impose harsher sentences on offenders whose repeated convictions
have shown their resistance to correction."' 64 Thus, the court reasoned that the statute's purpose of meting out harsh sentences to
recidivists would be defeated3 65if the statute only applied to convictions in Illinois state courts.
C.

Reduction or Modification of Sentence

In People v. Crete,3 6 6 the court addressed whether the trial court
was required to enter an order reducing or modifying a sentence
within thirty days of sentencing. 367 Eight days after the court sentenced the defendant, Gary Crete, he filed a motion to vacate or
modify the sentence. 368 Because the trial court failed to rule on the
motion within thirty days of sentencing, it denied the motion.369
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts correctly had determined that a trial court cannot vacate or modify a
sentence pursuant to a defendant's motion if the order doing so is
not entered within thirty days from the sentencing date.37 °
In dissent, Justice Simon sharply criticized the majority opinion.
He asserted that the outcome of a defendant's motion to modify or
reduce his sentence should not rest upon whether or not the court
is able to rule on the motion within thirty days from sentencing.371
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the majority opinion raised
a substantial constitutional issue because a person seeking a reduction or modification of his sentence pursuant to a "statutorily created liberty interest," could not be deprived of this interest for
reasons not within his control.372
364. Id. at 21, 495 N.E.2d at 494 (quoting People v. Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d 469, 476,
433 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1982), and People v. Baker, 114 Ill. App. 3d 803, 810, 448 N.E.2d
631, 637 (2d Dist. 1983)).
365. Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at 21-22, 495 N.E.2d at 494.
366. 113 Ill. 2d 156, 497 N.E.2d 751 (1986).
367. Id. at 159, 497 N.E.2d at 753.
368. Id. at 158, 497 N.E.2d at 752.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 162-63, 497 N.E.2d at 754-55. The court reached this result with reluctance; however, it reasoned that the clear language of the statute had to be given effect.
Id. at 162, 497 N.E.2d at 754.
371. Id. at 166, 497 N.E.2d at 756 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon stated, "the
majority's interpretation gives us... a... roulette justice under which a defendant who
moves promptly to modify or reduce the sentence may or may not have his motion considered depending on the vagaries of the court's docket . . . and whether or not the
sentencing judge gets around to ruling on the motion." Id.
372. Id. at 168, 497 N.E.2d at 757 (Simon, J., dissenting).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 18

D. Death Penalty
In People v. Buggs, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the defendant's death sentence, holding that the sentence was excessive in
view of the mitigating evidence.374 In mitigation, the defendant,
Carrus Buggs, showed that he had completed twenty-one years of
military service and that he had no prior serious criminal record.33 7"65
The evidence also indicated that Buggs had an alcohol problem.
Accordingly, the court held that the circumstances presented did
not "bespeak a man with a malignant
heart who must be perma377
37 3

nently eliminated from society.

37
The court also vacated a death sentence in People v. Adams. 1
In Adams, the prosecutor committed two significant errors during
the sentencing hearing. 379 First, the prosecutor asserted in closing
373. 112 Ill. 2d 284, 493 N.E.2d 332 (1986).
374. Id. at 295, 493 N.E.2d at 337.
375. Id. at 294, 493 N.E.2d at 336. The defendant was convicted of killing his wife
by setting her on fire after an argument. Id. at 288, 493 N.E.2d at 333. Buggs's son also
was killed in the fire. Id.
376. Id. at 295-96, 493 N.E.2d at 337. The Buggs court reasoned that the mitigating
circumstances in Buggs were analogous to those presented in People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d
564, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980), in which the court set aside the death penalty as excessive in
light of evidence that Carlson had no prior criminal record and had a history of military
service. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d at 393-95, 404 N.E.2d at 336. In Carlson, the defendant was
convicted of shooting and burning his ex-wife and of shooting a police officer. Carlson,
79 Ill. 2d at 570, 404 N.E.2d at 235. Evidence showed that the offense occurred after a
marital argument and that Carlson was an elderly man in deteriorating health. Id. at
589-90, 404 N.E.2d at 244-45.
377. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d at 294, 493 N.E.2d at 336 (quoting People v. Carlson, 79 Ill.
2d at 590, 404 N.E.2d at 245). The supreme court in Buggs also held that although
Buggs failed to preserve the issue of whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived a
sentencing jury, he did not waive his right to review of the issue on appeal. Buggs, 112
Ill. 2d at 290-91, 493 N.E.2d at 334. The court stated that when there has been a plain
error that has affected substantial rights, the waiver rule will not apply. Id. (citing People
v. Foster, 76 Ill. 2d 365, 392 N.E.2d 6 (1979). See also infra note 413 for exceptions to
the waiver rule under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a). In Buggs, the defendant's
constitutional right to a jury was affected, so no waiver resulted. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d at
290-91, 493 N.E.2d at 334. Buggs asserted that his jury waiver was neither knowing nor
voluntary because the court did not inform him that the jury had to be unanimous in
voting for the death sentence. Id. at 292, 493 N.E.2d at 335. In response, the court
reiterated its previous holdings that a court need not inform a defendant of the unanimity
requirement before accepting jury waivers at death sentencing hearings. Id. (citing People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21, 478 N.E.2d 392, 400 (1985); People v. Albanese,
104 Ill. 2d 504, 535, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1044 (1985)).
378. 109 Ill. 2d 102, 485 N.E.2d 339 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1476 (1986).
379. Id. at 123, 485 N.E.2d at 346. The first phase of the sentencing hearing is to
determine the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. The State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed murder, was over 18 years of age at the
time of the offense, and that there is at least one statutory aggravating factor. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(1985).
If the State meets its burden of proof, the second phase of the sentencing hearing is
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argument that the defendant, Larry Adams, would have killed
other persons if they had interrupted the robbery at issue.3"' The
court held that this argument had no relevance and could have
forced the jurors to focus on other potential victims, rather than on
Adams's eligibility for the death penalty.38 1 Second, the prosecutor
argued that Adams could be sentenced to death because he killed a
witness to the crime of armed robbery.38 2 The court noted that this
argument misstated the law because the statutory aggravating factor of killing a witness refers to a victim who witnessed an unrelated crime.383 Therefore, the court vacated Adams's sentence and
remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.384
In People ex rel. Daley v. Hett,38 5 the state's attorney sought a

writ of mandamus to prevent a trial court from accepting, prior to
trial, a defendant's waiver of his right to be sentenced by a jury in a
capital case.
The State grounded its argument on the Illinois
appellate decision in People v. Woljbrandt,3 87 which held that a de388
fendant could not enter a pretrial waiver of a sentencing jury.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that Woybrandt was decided inconducted. During this phase, the court considers factors in aggravation and mitigation
that are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at para. 9-1(c). The defendant will not be sentenced to death unless the court finds that there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence. Id. at para. 9-1(g), (h).
380. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d at 125, 485 N.E. 2d at 347.
381. Id. (citing People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1, 25-29, 452 N.E.2d 525, 536-39 (1983)).
382. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d at 125-26, 485 N.E.2d at 347. The defendant was eligible for
the death penalty because he had committed a murder during the course of committing a
robbery; the fact that the victim was a witness to the felony had no significance. Id. at
125-26, 485 N.E.2d at 348.
383. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(8)(1985)). Paragraph 9-1(b)(8)
provides that it is an aggravating factor if: "the murdered individual was a witness in a
prosecution against the defendant, gave material assistance to the state ... or was an eye
witness or possessed other material evidence against the defendant or another .... " ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(8) (1985).

384. Adams, 109 Il. 2d at 129, 485 N.E.2d at 349. The court also held that it was
error to admit as evidence in the sentencing hearing that a police officer saw Adams while
investigating an unrelated armed robbery, took him into custody, but never charged him
with an offense arising from that investigation. Id.
385. 113 Ill. 2d 75, 495 N.E.2d 513 (1986).
386. Id. at 77, 495 N.E.2d at 514. Hett originated when the state's attorney filed
motions for leave to file complaints for writs of mandamus or writs of prohibition, or, in
the alternative, supervisory orders under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 383. The court
determined that writs of mandamus and writs of prohibition were procedurally inappropriate in this case. Id. at 80, 495 N.E.2d at 515-16.
387. 127 Ill. App. 3d 836, 469 N.E.2d 305 (3d Dist. 1984).
388. Herr, 113 Ill. 2d at 81, 495 N.E.2d at 516 (citing Woljbrandt, 127 Ill. App. 3d at
844, 469 N.E.2d at 312). In Wolfbrandt, a defendant in a capital case attempted to waive
the sentencing jury during voir dire and the trial court refused to accept the waiver. Id.
at 843, 469 N.E.2d at 311. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the waiver was
untimely. Id. at 844, 469 N.E.2d at 312.
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correctly and that the capital sentencing statute389 did not prohibit
a pretrial waiver of a sentencing jury. 390 The court construed the
statute as neither limiting nor clarifying the point at which the defendant could exercise a waiver. 39 Thus, the court held that the
trial court had the authority to accept a pretrial waiver of a senthe defendant voluntarily and knowtencing jury, provided that
392
ingly waived that right.
During the sentencing hearing in People v. Olinger,393 the trial
court stated that the defendant, Perry Olinger, had "the burden of
proving [that the death penalty] does not apply.

' 394

Noting that

the Illinois death penalty statute places upon the State the burden
of proof of establishing the aggravating factors necessary to impose
a death sentence, Olinger argued that the trial court's statement
represented an erroneous shifting to the defendant of the burden of
proof at sentencing. 395 The supreme court, however, held that
"taken in context, it is clear that the trial court meant only that
[after] the State established the existence of statutory aggravating
factors, [Olinger] had the burden of coming forward with evidence
of mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
penalty. ' 396 Thus, the court held that the trial court did not improperly place the burden of proof on the defendant.3 97
In People v. Szabo,39 s the court held that a defendant who testifies at the sentencing hearing cannot shield himself from cross-ex389. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(d)(3)(1985), provides that "the court shall
conduct a separate sentencing hearing . . . to consider any aggravating or mitigating
Id.
factors ......
390. Hett, 113 Ill. 2d at 81-82, 495 N.E.2d at 516-17.
391. Id. at 82, 495 N.E.2d at 516. The ruling effects voir dire in a capital case, in that
a defendant's pretrial waiver of a sentencing jury eliminates the need to conduct Witherspoon questioning in the voir dire. For discussion of this issue, see this article's section on
jury selection, supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
392. Id. at 82, 495 N.E.2d at 516.
393. 112 Ill. 2d 324, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986).
394. Id. at 351, 493 N.E.2d at 592.
395. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-l(f)(1985) ("[B]urden of proof of establishing the existence of any... [aggravating] factors.., is on the State and shall not be
satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt").
396. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d at 351, 493 N.E.2d at 592. See People v. DelVecchio, 105 I11.
2d 414, 445-46, 475 N.E.2d 840, 855 (constitutionally permissible to place the burden of
production of mitigating evidence on the defendant), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 204 (1985).
397. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d at 351, 493 N.E.2d at 592. The court also reaffirmed its prior
holding in People v. Stewart, 104 I11.2d 463, 493-94, 473 N.E.2d 1227, 1241 (1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985), that sympathy was not a proper factor to be considered in a
capital sentencing hearing. See also People v. Wright, 111 111. 2d 128, 164, 490 N.E.2d
640, 654 (1985) (decision to impose the death penalty must be based on reason rather
than emotion).
398. 113 I11.2d 83, 497 N.E.2d 995 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1330 (1987).
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amination. 99 In Szabo, the defendant, Joseph Szabo, wanted to
testify about his behavior since being imprisoned.'
Szabo also
moved to preclude cross-examination pertaining to the murders he
committed. 4" The trial court denied this motion and on appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this ruling. 4°02 Although the
supreme court agreed that Szabo could introduce evidence of good
conduct during his incarceration,' 3 it also ruled that a capital defendant could be impeached at a death penalty hearing according
to the usual rules of evidence.'0 1
XI.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

A.

Waiver

In People v. Szabo," 5 the court also addressed the issue of
whether the defendant had failed to preserve issues for appeal. The
court held that assignment of error to rulings at a capital sentencing hearing must be raised in a motion for a new trial and that
failure to raise those issue constituted a waiver for purposes of
appeal. 4 6
In People v. Friesland,40 7 the State charged the defendant, William Friesland, and a co-defendant with burglary." 8 The co-defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and became the State's key
witness. 409 The trial court denied Friesland's pretrial discovery
motion requesting the co-defendant's mental health records.4 1°
On appeal, Friesland argued that this denial violated his sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses. 4 ' The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, held that Friesland could not raise the issue because he had waived it by not including it in his post-trial motion
for a new trial.412 Additionally, the court ruled that none of the
399. Id. at 95, 497 N.E.2d at 1000.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. The defendant did not testify but made an offer of proof as to what his
testimony would have been. Id.
403. Id. (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 106 S. Ct. 1669 (1986)).
404. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d at 95, 497 N.E.2d at 1000.
405. 113 Ill. 2d 83, 497 N.E.2d 995 (1986).
406. Id. at 93, 497 N.E.2d at 999.
407. 109 Il. 2d 369, 488 N.E.2d 261 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1330 (1987).
408. Id. at 372, 488 N.E.2d at 261.
409. Id. at 372-73, 488 N.E.2d at 262.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 373, 488 N.E.2d at 262.
412. Id. at 374, 488 N.E.2d at 262.
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recognized exceptions to the waiver rule were applicable.4" 3 Furthermore, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the
State was foreclosed from asserting the defendant's waiver because
it failed to object when the defense counsel raised the issue.41 4
People v. Porter415 also addressed the issue of whether the defendant had failed to preserve issues for appeal. In that case, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that even though it automatically reviewed death penalty cases, trial counsel still had an obligation to
comply with the statutory provisions regarding motions for a new
trial.41 6 Therefore, the court applied the general rule that failure to
raise an issue in a written motion for a new trial constitutes a
waiver of that issue for purposes of review.41 7
413. Id. at 375, 488 N.E.2d at 263. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a), the
exceptions to the waiver rule are:
(1) an appeal involving a failure to prove a material allegation of an indictment;
(2) an alleged error is raised which is one that would not normally be expected
to be included in the post-trial motion;
(3) an error is raised on appeal and the reviewing court decides to take notice of
plain error involving substantial rights.
ILL. S. CT. R. 615(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 615(a)(1985).
In People v. Black, 107 111. App. 3d 591, 437 N.E.2d 1282 (2d Dist. 1982), the court
held that "the doctrine of plain error may be invoked in criminal cases where the evidence is closely balanced or is of such magnitude that the accused is denied a fair trial."
Id. at 593, 437 N.E.2d at 1284. The court in Friesland held that the evidence was not
closely balanced and that the alleged error was not of great magnitude. Friesland,109 Ill.
2d at 375, 488 N.E.2d at 263.
414. Friesland,109 Ill. 2d at 377, 488 N.E.2d at 264.
415. 111 Ill. 2d 386, 489 N.E.2d 1329, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 298 (1986).
416. Id. at 399, 489 N.E.2d at 1334. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 116-1 (1985),
provides:
(a) Following a verdict or finding of guilty the court may grant the defendant a
new trial.
(b) A written motion for a new trial shall be filed by the defendant within 30
days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict. Reasonable
notice of the motion shall be served upon the state.
(c) The motion for a new trial shall specify the grounds therefor.
Id. See People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 32-33, 464 N.E.2d 223, 227 (fact that the
Illinois Supreme Court has a duty to review death penalty cases does not relieve trial
counsel from his obligation to file a written motion for a new trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
963 (1984).
417. Porter, 111 Ill. 2d at 339, 489 N.E.2d at 1334 (citing People v. Pickett, 54 Ill. 2d
280, 282, 296 N.E.2d 856, 857 (1973)). See also People v. Free, 112 Ill. 2d 154, 170, 492
N.E.2d 1269, 1276 (defendant's failure to object to testimony admitted during his sentencing hearing constituted a waiver of his right to raise the issue on appeal), cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 246 (1986).
In Porter, the defendant's post-trial motion raised the general issue of whether the
defendant was denied a trial by an impartial jury; the motion, however, omitted any
reference to the adequacy of the voir dire examination. Porter, 111 Ill. 2d at 399, 989
N.E.2d at 1334. The defendant challenged the voir dire examination as error in the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. In spite of its holding that the defendant had waived the issue,
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B.

Post-Conviction Act

One of the most significant post-conviction cases decided during
the Survey period was People v. Joseph.41 8 In Joseph, the petitioner,
Michael Joseph, filed a post-conviction petition and motion pursuant to section 122-8 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, requesting that the court's chief judge assign the case to a judge other than
the one who presided at trial.41 9 The trial court denied Joseph's
motion, ruling that the statute was unconstitutional.42 °
On appeal, the State asserted that the statute usurped the chief
judge's authority to assign judges to cases.4 21 The supreme court

agreed, holding that section 122-8 violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution by directly interfering with
the judicial power of assignment.4 224 23
Accordingly, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's ruling.
In dissent, Justice Simon disagreed that the statute violated the
the court proceeded to address and reject Porter's argument concerning the adequacy of
voir dire. Id. at 402-05, 489 N.E.2d at 1335-37.
418. 113 Ill. 2d 36, 495 N.E.2d 501 (1986).
419. Id. at 40, 495 N.E.2d at 503. Section 122-1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
provides in relevant part, "Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his
rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both may
institute a proceeding under this Article." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1985).
Section 122-8 provided, "All proceedings under this Article shall be conducted by a
judge who was not involved in the original proceeding which resulted in conviction."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-8 (1985).
420. Joseph, 113 I11.2d at 40, 495 N.E.2d at 503.
421. Id. at 46, 495 N.E.2d at 505.
422. Id. at 48, 495 N.E.2d at 507. The separation of powers clause provides: "The
legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers
properly belonging to another." ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1. See People v. Jackson, 69 Ill.
2d 252, 256, 371 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1977) ("If the power is judicial in character, the legislature is expressly prohibited from exercising it").
423. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d at 48, 495 N.E.2d at 507. In People v. Mason, 145 Ill. App.
3d 218, 494 N.E.2d 1176 (1st Dist. 1986), the court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of section 122-2.1 of the Act which provides, prior to the appointment of
counsel, for the dismissal of post-conviction petitions which the court considers "frivolous" or "patently without merit". Mason, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 219, 494 N.E.2d at 1177
(citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1 (1985)). The appellate court in Mason held
that section 122-2.1 conflicted with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c), which requires
the appointment of counsel at the appellate level for an indigent post-conviction petitioner. Mason, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 221, 494 N.E.2d at 1178 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 651(c),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 651(c) (1985)). The court held that section 122-2.1
violated the separation-of-powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. Mason, 148 Ill.
App. 3d at 222, 494 N.E.2d at 1179. The defendant in Mason also raised the issue of the
constitutionality of section 122-8, but the court declined to consider the question in view
of the fact that at the time of the appeal, Joseph was pending before the Illinois Supreme
Court. Id. at 226, 494 N.E.2d at 1181.
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separation of powers clause.424 He stated that the legislature made
a determination that "due to a contraction of other procedural
safeguards, the defendant should be protected by having a fresh eye
'
This neceslook at the case before it is summarily dismissed."425
sary safeguard, according to Justice Simon, had only a "peripheral" impact on the administration of the judicial system, similar to
statutes prescribing rules of evidence, or statutes of limitation, and
did not in any way represent a legislative attempt to usurp judicial
authority to manage the courts.426 Furthermore, Justice Simon
stated that, "[t]his decision leaves future decisionmakers to chart
an unsurveyed course and likely wander in the wilderness of our
separation-of-powers jurisprudence.' '427
In People v. Correa,428 the supreme court held that, notwithstanding the fact that the Post-Conviction Act applies to "any person imprisoned in the penitentiary",429 the petitioner, Cesar
Correa, could request post-conviction relief even though he was
not incarcerated when he filed the petition. 4 30 Because Correa was

serving a period of mandatory supervised release at the time he
filed the petition and because Correa could be confined if he violated a condition of his release, the court concluded that Correa
had the right to file a post-conviction petition.431
Similarly, in People v. Younger 432 and People v. MartinTrigona,4 33 the court held that post-conviction relief could be re-

quested by all whose liberty potentially could be restrained as a
result of a criminal conviction.434 Therefore, the court held that
4 36
435 or released on an appeal bond
defendants placed on parole

had the right to seek post-conviction relief.
424. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d at 51, 495 N.E.2d at 508 (Simon, J., dissenting).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 50, 495 N.E.2d at 508 (Simon, J., dissenting).
427. Id. at 58-59, 495 N.E.2d at 512 (Simon, J., dissenting).
428. 108 Ill. 2d 541, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985).
429. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1985). For the text of section 122-1, see
supra note 419.
430. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d at 547, 485 N.E.2d at 309.
431. Id. at 546-47, 485 N.E.2d at 309.
432. 112 Ill. 2d 422, 494 N.E.2d 145 (1986).
433. 111 Ill. 2d 295, 489 N.E.2d 1356 (1986).
434. Younger, 112 Ill. 2d at 426-27, 494 N.E.2d at 146-47; Martin-Trigona, 111 11.
2d at 301, 489 N.E.2d at 1359.
435. Younger, 112 Ill. 2d at 422, 494 N.E.2d at 145.
436. Martin-Trigona, 111 Ill. 2d at 298, 489 N.E.2d at 1357.
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C. Appealable Decisions
In People v. Boyt,437 the trial court granted the defendant's motion to enforce a plea agreement.438 The State refused to abide by
the agreement and consequently the trial court dismissed the
charges against the defendant, Kathleen Boyt.4 39 The State then
appealed the dismissal order."4°
On appeal, defendant Boyt argued that Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 604(a)(1) allowed the State to appeal only when the court
dismissed a charge because of a defective charging instrument, a
quashed arrest or search warrant, or suppressed evidence. 44 ' The
supreme court, however, held that the State had the right to appeal
from "any judgment the substantive effect of which resulted in the
dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint."" 2 Accordingly, the court held that the443State had the right to appeal from the
dismissal of Boyt's charges.
XII.

BAIL LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

On November 4, 1986, Illinois voters approved a proposed
amendment to article I, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution, authorizing preventive detention of some persons accused of serious
crimes. The amended provision enables courts to deny bail to any
defendant who is charged with a non-probationable offense 4 and
2d 403, 488 N.E.2d 264 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2254 (1986).
437. 109 Ill.
438. Id. at 410, 488 N.E.2d at 268.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 411, 488 N.E.2d at 268.
441. Id. (citing ILL. S. Cr. R. 604(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para.
604(a)(1)(1985)). Rule 604 (a)(l) provides: "In criminal cases the state may appeal only
from an order of judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge
for any of the grounds enunciated in section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint;
quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence." ILL. S. CT. R. 604(a)(1),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A para. 604(a)(1) (1985).
442. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d at 411, 488 N.E.2d at 268 (quoting People v. Love, 39 Ill. 2d
436, 439, 235 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1968)).
443. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d at 411, 488 N.E.2d at 268. The court also held that the dismissal was adverse to the State, and, contrary to Boyt's assertions, the State did not "obtain"
the dismissal of the indictments. Id. at 411-12, 388 N.E.2d at 268-69. Rather, the dismissal of the indictments was intended to be a sanction against the State. Id.
444. In Illinois, the following offenses are non-probationable: (1) murder when the
death penalty is not imposed; (2) attempt murder; (3) any Class X felony; (4) a violation
of section 407 of the Controlled Substance Act; (5) a violation of section 9 of the Cannabis Control Act; (6) a Class 2 or greater felony if the offender had been convicted of a
Class 2 or greater felony within 10 years of the date on which he committed the offense
for which he is being sentenced; (7) residential burglary; and (8) certain instances of
criminal sexual assault. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3 (1986).
Examples of Class X felonies in Illinois are home invasion, aggravated criminal sexual
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who poses a threat to any person's safety. Specifically, the article
now reads:
Article I
Section 9. Bail and Habeas Corpus

All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
the following offenses where the proof is evident or the presump-

tion great: capital offenses; offenses for which a sentence of life
imprisonment may be imposed as a consequence of conviction,
andfelony offenses for which a sentence of imprisonment, without
conditional and revocable release, shall be imposed by law as a
consequence of conviction, when the court, after a hearing, determines that release of the offender would pose a real and present
threat to the physical safety of any person. The privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
rebellion or invasion when the public safety may require it.
Any costs accruing to a unit of local government as a result of
the denial of bailpursuant to the 1986 Amendment to this Section
shall be reimbursed by the State to the unit of local government.

(The newly adopted language is indicated by italics).
The amendment marks an abandonment of the traditional theory of bail in Illinois - to insure the defendant's appearance at
trial. Formerly, judges could deny bail only in instances when the
defendant was charged with a crime that had a penalty of life imprisonment or capital punishment or when the defendant was unlikely to appear at trial." 5 The prohibition of bail for these
offenders was based not on the dangerousness of the defendant but,
rather, on the theory that the harsh penalty would cause a defendant to flee the community.
The United States Supreme Court has agreed to consider
whether a similar federal pretrial detention provision is constitutional;" 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruled that the preventive detention provision of the federal Bail
assault, and aggravated arson. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 12-11, 12-14, 20-1.1
(1985).
445. Section 9 of the Illinois Constitution was previously amended on November 2,
1982. Prior to that change, all persons were bailable except for those charged with capital offenses and those unlikely to appear at trial. The 1982 change added as nonbailable
"offenses for which a sentence of life imprisonment may be imposed as a consequence of
conviction where the proof is evident or the presumption great." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9
(1983). It is not clear whether section 9 denies a judge discretion to set bail for the
enumerated offenses. No Illinois case answers this question.
446. The United States Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari for
United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986). The case was argued January 20, 1987.
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Reform Act 447 was unconstitutional as a violation of the fifth

amendment due process clause." 8
The state's bail statute was altered in several ways by recently
enacted legislation. Public Act 84-945, effective September 25,
1985, amended several areas of criminal procedure regarding bail.
First, the Act provides that a sentence imposed for a willful failure
to surrender after forfeiture of bail or for violation of bail conditions shall be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on the
defendant for the original charge. 449
Regarding proceedings after arrest, the statute now requires a
judge to advise a defendant that, if he escapes from custody prior
to trial or, after being admitted to bail and released on bond, he
fails to appear in court when required, he waives his right to confront the witnesses against him and the trial will continue in his
absence. 450 Further, the defendant will be required to sign a certificate indicating that he understands the consequences in the event
that he fails to present himself in court for trial.451
Another change in the statute provides that the court should set
monetary bail, as opposed to release on recognizance, only after it
has concluded that no other condition of release will reasonably
assure that the defendant will appear in court.452
447. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(Supp. 11 1984). The federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 authorizes detention pending trial where "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community .
I..."
Id.
448. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986). In Salerno, the court
stated, "the sole bases for the detention order in this case are the findings that the defendants would, if released, carry on 'business as usual' notwithstanding any release conditions, and that business as usual involves threats and crimes of violence. We regard sect.
3142(e)'s authorization of pretrial detention on this ground as repugnant to the concept
of substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total deprivation of liberty
simply as a means of preventing future crimes." Id. at 71-72.
See also United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986) (preventive
detention is per se violative of due process). A number of federal courts have held that
the length of the preventive detention may result in a due process violation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Frisone, 795 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Melendez-Carrion,
790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Lofranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). See also United States v.
Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 1986) ("at some point the length of delay might raise
due process objections"); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 n.5 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (defendant who is detained beyond 70-90 days "may have valid statutory and
constitutional arguments favoring his release on bail or from detention.").
449. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-10 (1985).
450. Id. at para. 109-1. What is novel in the alteration in paragraph 109-1 is not that
a defendant may be tried in absentia, but, rather, that the judge must advise the defendant
of the consequences of failure to appear in court when required. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id. at para. 110-2.
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Further, the court must determine not only the amount of bail,
but also the conditions of release.453 The amount of bail and the
conditions of release should reasonably assure the defendant's appearance at trial or the safety of any other person in the community.4 54 In making this determination, the court shall consider
such matters as the weight of the evidence against the defendant,
his family ties, employment, financial resources, prior record, and
prior failure to appear in court.4 55
Another legislative change regards additional alternative conditions which may be imposed when a person is released before
trial.45 6 The additions include observing a curfew, remaining in the
custody of a specific person or organization which has agreed to
supervise the defendant's release, and "such other reasonable con'
ditions as the court may impose."457
Finally, Public Act 84-945 provides that if a person who is
charged with a felony is released pending trial, and subsequently
commits a separate felony, any sentence imposed on that separate
felony shall be served consecutively to any sentence imposed on the
original felony.458 The same rule also applies to a person who commits a separate felony after being admitted to bail following conviction of a felony.459
Another statute enacted during the Survey period also pertains
to bail. Public Act 84-964, effective January 1, 1986, provides that
a person found in Illinois who is allegedly in violation of a bail
453. Id. at para. 110-5
454. Id. at para. 110-5(a). This same standard recently has been approved by the
voters as reflected in the constitutional amendment to article I, section 9 of the Illinois
Constitution. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
455. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 110-5(a) (1985). Additionally, in instances in
which drugs have been seized from a defendant, the "street value" of the drugs is considered by the court in the assessment of the amount of bail. In such cases, the State may
submit a written estimate, based on reliable information by a law enforcement official
assessing the "street value" of the drug seized. Id. at para. 110-5(b)(4).
Further, if a defendant is charged with a Class X felony under the "Illinois Controlled
Substances Act," the court may require the defendant to deposit a sum equal to 100% of
the bail. Id. at para. 110-7(a). For other offenses, the defendant need only deposit money
equal to 10% of the bail. Id.
456. Id. at para. 110-10(b)).
457. Id. at para. 110-10(b)(12)-(14). Current possible conditions include (1) refraining from possessing a firearm, from approaching or communicating with particular
persons, from going to certain described geographical areas, from engaging in certain
activities, (2) undergoing drug addiction, alcohol, or medical or psychiatric treatment, (3)
supporting dependents, (4) working or pursuing a course of study, and (5) attending or
residing in a facility designated by the court. Id. at para. 110-10(l)-(l 1).
458. Id. at para. 1005-8-4(h).
459. Id. at para. 1005-8-4(i).
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bond in another state may not be seized or unwillingly transported
to that state by a bail bondsman. 46
XIII.

CONCLUSION

Criminal law and procedure continue to be areas to which the
Illinois Supreme Court gives substantial attention. This Survey period was no exception. The court has continued to provide guidance in developing areas, such as standards for assessing
competency of counsel and evaluating the legality of searches and
seizures. In addition, this year the court decided significant issues
in regard to jury selection, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and
guilty pleas.

460.

Id. at para. 103-9.

